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Abstract
Without monetary payments, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem proves that under mild
requirements all truthful social choice mechanisms must be dictatorships. When payments
are allowed, the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism implements the value-maximizing
choice, and has many other good properties: it is strategy-proof, onto, deterministic, individually
rational, and does not make positive transfers to the agents. By Roberts’ theorem, with three or
more alternatives, the weighted VCG mechanisms are essentially unique for domains with quasi-
linear utilities. The goal of this paper is to characterize domains of non-quasi-linear utilities
where “reasonable” mechanisms (with VCG-like properties) exist. Our main result is a tight
characterization of the maximal non quasi-linear utility domain, which we call the largest parallel
domain. We extend Roberts’ theorem to parallel domains, and use the generalized theorem to
prove two impossibility results. First, any reasonable mechanism must be dictatorial when the
utility domain is quasi-linear together with any single non-parallel type. Second, for richer
utility domains that still differ very slightly from quasi-linearity, every strategy-proof, onto and
deterministic mechanism must be a dictatorship.
1 Introduction
We study social choice mechanisms that aggregate individual preferences and select one among a
finite set of alternatives. Our interest is in the existence of strategy-proof social choice mechanisms
under general, non quasi-linear utility functions. In the classical voting problem without money,
the seminal Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem [Gibbard, 1973, Satterthwaite, 1975] states that if
agents’ preferences can be any ordering over the alternatives, the only deterministic, onto (i.e.
every alternative can be selected) and strategy-proof mechanisms for three or more alternatives
are dictatorial. On the other hand, with the introduction of monetary transfers and quasi-linear
utilities, the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism [Vickrey, 1961, Clarke, 1971, Groves, 1973]
maximizes social welfare in dominant strategies, and can be generalized to implement any affine
maximizer of agents’ values [Roberts, 1979, Krishna and Perry, 1998].
However, quasi-linearity is a strong assumption, violated for example in domains with bud-
get constraints and problems with lack of liquidity [Cramton, 1997] or with wealth effect and
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risk-aversion [Pratt, 1992]. Non quasi-linearity can also arise as a result of the timing of pay-
ments coupled with temporal preferences [Frederick et al., 2002], when payments are contingent on
agents’ actions and the presence of payments affects decisions and thus the likelihood of contingen-
cies [Ma et al., 2016b,c], and in the context of illiquid currencies such as points-based allocation
schemes [Kash et al., 2007].
To the best of our knowledge, few papers considered social choice mechanisms with monetary
transfers and non quasi-linear utilities.1 The main result of this paper is a tight characterization
of the maximal utility domain, which we name the largest parallel domain, where there exist non-
dictatorial mechanisms that are strategy-proof, onto, deterministic, individually rational and satisfy
no subsidy (i.e. no positive transfers from the mechanism to the agents). These properties are those
of the VCG mechanism in quasi-linear utility domains. As a special case, we prove that for utility
domains that contain all quasi-linear types but do not reside within the largest parallel domain,
the only mechanisms satisfying the above conditions must be dictatorial. The proofs make use of a
generalized Roberts’ theorem, which we extended to non quasi-linear utility domains with suitable
properties. We also provide a negative result for a broader class of mechanisms: by allowing richer
utility domains that still differ very slightly from quasi-linearity, we establish the impossibility of
non-dictatorial mechanisms even without requiring individual rationality or no subsidy.
A key observation is that the critical property of agents’ utilities that enables non-dictatorial
mechanisms is not the linear dependency on payments. We say the utility functions of an agent
is of parallel type if for any two alternatives a and b, within the range of interest, no matter how
much the agent is charged for b, to achieve the same utility, the additional amount she is willing
to pay for a stays the same. Quasi-linear utility functions have this property, but there can also be
non quasi-linear parallel types. Intuitively, a type being parallel requires that regardless of which
alternative is selected, the agent’s marginal cost for money is the same as long as she has the same
utility level— the trade-off with money depends on how happy the agent is, not how much she is
paying. A domain where all types are parallel is called a parallel domain, and the largest parallel
domain is the set of all parallel types.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. After a brief discussion of related work, we provide
in Section 2 a formal definition of parallel domains. We prove a positive result in Section 3, that
within the parallel domains, the family of generalized weighted VCG mechanisms are strategy-proof,
onto, deterministic, individually rational (IR), and satisfy no subsidy. In Section 4, we generalize
Roberts’ Theorem [Roberts, 1979] to parallel domains, and prove that when the differences in
agents’ willingness to pay for different alternatives are unrestricted, maximizers of affine functions
of the willingness to pay are the only implementable choice rules amongst mechanisms with these
properties. With this characterization, we prove in Section 5 our main result— that when agents
have types outside of the parallel domain, the only mechanisms that are strategy-proof, onto,
deterministic, individually rational, and satisfy no subsidy must be fixed-price dictatorships, i.e.
there exists a dictator who chooses her favorite alternative given fixed prices associated with each
alternative. We also develop a negative result for a broader class of mechanisms: by allowing utility
domains that are slightly richer in their non quasi-linearity, we show that individual rationality
and no subsidy can be relaxed, while the impossibility of non-dictatorial mechanisms can still be
established. We give in Section 5.1, for example, an impossibility result for a two-slopes domain,
when the utility function of each agent for each alternative is linear, with the slope taking one of
two possible values. Proofs omitted from the body of the paper are provided in Appendix A.
1A preliminary, short version of this paper [Ma et al., 2016a] proved a special case of the impossibility result for
two agents and the richest non quasi-linear utility domain, with additional assumptions of unanimity and neutrality.
The proof techniques are different, and this preliminary version does not make use of the generalized Roberts theorem.
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1.1 Related Work
In social choice without monetary payments, the classical Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem has been
extended to more restricted preference domains, including the saturated domains [Kalai et al.,
1979], linked domains [Aswal et al., 2003], circular domains [Sato, 2010], and weakly connected
domains [Pramanik, 2015]. Domains for which there are positive results have also been extensively
studied, see Black’s majority rule [Black, 1948], Moulin’s median voting schemes and generaliza-
tions [Moulin, 1980, Nehring and Puppe, 2007] and results on graphs with metric spaces [Barbera,
2001, Schummer and Vohra, 2002, Dokow et al., 2012].
For social choice with payments and quasi-linear utilities, Roberts [1979] showed that with three
or more alternatives, when the values can take any real numbers, positive association of differences is
necessary and sufficient for strategy-proof implementation, and that the only implementable choice
rules are affine maximizers of agent values. Such choice rules can be implemented by weighted VCG
mechanisms [Krishna and Perry, 1998]. Characterizations of strategy-proof implementations have
also been developed for mechanism design problems in specific domains [Myerson, 1981, Rochet,
1987, Lavi et al., 2003, Bikhchandani et al., 2006, Saks and Yu, 2005].
One approach to mechanism design without quasi-linearity is to assume that the functional
form of agent utility functions is known to the designer, for example auctions public budget con-
straints [Dobzinski et al., 2012], or auctions with known risk preferences [Maskin and Riley, 1984].
In contrast, we assume that the functional form of agent utility functions are private. For private
non quasi-linear utilities, under suitable richness of type space, Kazumura et al. [2017] prove a “tax-
ation principle” style characterization and a “revenue uniqueness” result of truthful mechanisms,
and show various applications to problems other than social choice, e.g. single item allocation. The
existence of truthful and non-dictatorial social choice mechanisms is not discussed.
For the assignment problem with unit demand, the minimum Walrasian-equilibrium mecha-
nism is known to be truthful [Demange and Gale, 1985, Alaei et al., 2010, Aggarwal et al., 2009,
Du¨tting et al., 2009, Morimoto and Serizawa, 2015], even for any general non-increasing utility
function in payment. On the other hand, truthfulness cannot be achieved together with Pareto-
efficiency for allocation problems in which agents may demand more than one unit of good, or when
agents have multi-dimensional type spaces [Kazumura and Serizawa, 2016, Dobzinski et al., 2012,
Baisa, 2016]. We do not impose Pareto-efficiency (PE) in proving our impossibility results.2 Ran-
domized mechanisms for bilateral trade [Garratt and Pycia, 2014] and revenue-optimal auctions in
very simple settings [Baisa, 2017, Che et al., 2012, Pai and Vohra, 2014] have also been studied in
the context of private budget constraints. We focus here on social choice rather than assignment
or allocation problems, settings for which there is more structure on agents’ preferences and also
indifference toward outcomes where an agent’s own assignments are the same.
2 Preliminaries
Denote N = {1, 2, . . . , n} as the set of agents and A = {a, b, . . . ,m} as the set of alternatives. A
social choice mechanism accepts reports from agents as input, selects a single alternative a∗ ∈ A,
and may also determine payments. A mechanism is onto if for any alternative a ∈ A, there exists
a preference profile for which a is selected. A mechanism is dominant-strategy incentive compatible
(DSIC) if no agent can gain by reporting false preferences.
We allow monetary transfers, and the utility of an agent may depend both on the selected
alternative and her assigned payment. Denote ui,a(z) as the utility of agent i ∈ N if alternative a ∈
2With PE, however, we prove a similar dictatorship result, which in comparison to our main results, requires
weaker assumptions on agents utility domains. See Theorem 5 in Appendix B.
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A is selected and she needs to pay z ∈ R. ui = (ui,a, . . . , ui,m) determines agent i’s type and is her
private information. Denote u = (u1, . . . , un) as a type profile, and u−i = (u1, . . . , ui−1, ui+1, . . . , un)
as the type profile of agents except for agent i.
Denote the utility of alternative a to agent i at zero payment as vi,a , ui,a(0), which we call the
value of alternative a to agent i. Let a¯i ∈ argmaxa∈A vi,a and ai ∈ argmina∈A vi,a be a most and a
least preferred alternative at zero payment. A utility profile u is quasi-linear if ui,a(z) = vi,a−z for
all i ∈ N , a ∈ A and z ∈ R. In this case, the values {vi,a}i∈N,a∈A fully determine the type profile.
Let the quasi-linear domain UQL be the set of all quasi-linear types of a single agent where the
vi,a’s can take any value in R, and let UQL ,
∏n
i=1 UQL be the set of all quasi-linear type profiles.
We consider non quasi-linear utilities such that for all i ∈ N and all a ∈ A,
(S1) ui,a(z) is continuous and strictly decreasing in z,
(S2) limz→+∞ ui,a(z) < mina′∈A vi,a′ .
Property (S1) guarantees that agents strictly prefer to make smaller payments. Property (S2)
means that every agent prefers the worst alternative at zero payment to any alternative at some
very large payment. Denote the general non quasi-linear utility domain U0 as the set of all types
of an agent satisfying (S1) and (S2), and let U0 ,
∏n
i=1 U
0 be the general non quasi-linear utility
domain for a set of n agents.
A social choice mechanism (x, t) on type domain U ⊆ U0 is composed of a choice rule x : U → A
and a payment rule t = (t1, . . . , tn) : U → R
n. Thus if the reported type profile is uˆ ∈ U , the choice
made is x(uˆ), and the utility of agent i is ui,x(uˆ)(ti(uˆ)). A mechanism (x, t) is DSIC if and only
if, for any agent i ∈ N , any type ui ∈ Ui of agent i, and any reported profile from other agents
uˆ−i ∈ U−i, agent i cannot gain by misreporting any type uˆi ∈ Ui:
ui,x(ui,uˆ−i)(ti(ui, uˆ−i)) ≥ ui,x(uˆi,uˆ−i)(ti(uˆi, uˆ−i)). (1)
A mechanism is individually rational (IR) if and only if, by truthfully participating in the mech-
anism, regardless of the reports made by the other agents, no agent can be worse off than hav-
ing their worst alternative at zero payment selected and not making any payment.3 That is,
∀i ∈ N, ∀ui ∈ Ui, ∀uˆ−i ∈ U−i,
ui,x(ui,uˆ−i)(ti(ui, uˆ−i)) ≥ min
a∈A
vi,a. (2)
We are interested in mechanisms with the following set of properties.
P1. Dominant-strategy incentive compatible
P2. Deterministic
P3. Onto
P4. Individually rational
P5. No subsidy
Ontoness only requires that all alternatives will be selected given some type profile, but does
not require all payment schedules are achievable. No subsidy requires that the mechanism does not
make positive transfers to the agents.
Before continuing, we review a well-known characterization of deterministic DSIC mechanisms.
We say that a mechanism is agent-independent if an agent’s payment is independent of her report,
conditioned on a particular alternative being selected; i.e. fixing the type profile of the rest of
3For a mechanism where IR is violated, an agent may benefit from not participating. See Section 5 for more
discussions on voluntary participation. Assuming for all i ∈ N and a ∈ A, vi,a may take any non-negative value, for
DSIC mechanisms, this definition of IR is equivalent to requiring that the utility of any truthful agent is non-negative.
4
zui,a′(z)
u−1i,a (vi,b)
pi,b pi,a
vi,a
vi,b
vi,ai
ui, a (z)
u i, b (z)
ui,ai(z)
Figure 1: An example type in the parallel domain. All horizontal sections of the shaded area (e.g.
the dotted arrows) are of the same length, i.e. utility curves are horizontal translations of each
other within the range but need not be straight lines.
the agents u−i, ∀ui, u
′
i ∈ Ui, x(ui, u−i) = x(u
′
i, u−i) ⇒ ti(ui, u−i) = ti(u
′
i, u−i). Given an agent-
independent mechanism and any u−i ∈ U−i, if there exists ui ∈ Ui s.t. x(ui, u−i) = a, let the agent-
independent price be the payment i pays when a is selected: ti,a(u−i) , ti(ui, u−i), which depends
only on u−i. Otherwise, if x(ui, u−i) 6= a for all ui ∈ Ui, let ti,a(u−i) , +∞. An agent-independent
mechanism is also agent-maximizing if given the agent-independent prices {ti,a(u−i)}i∈N,a∈A, the
alternative selected by the mechanism maximizes the utilities of all agents simultaneously, i.e.
∀u ∈ U , ∃a∗ ∈ A s.t. a∗ ∈ argmaxa∈A ui,a(ti,a(u−i)) for all i ∈ N , and x(u) = a
∗. The properties
of agent-independence and agent-maximization are necessary and sufficient for deterministic DSIC
mechanisms with quasi-linear utilities [Vohra, 2011], and this equivalence can be easily generalized
to general utilities that strictly decrease with payment.
A dictatorship in social-choice without money identifies an agent i∗ as the dictator, and always
selects her favorite alternative. We generalize this concept for social choice with money as follows:
Definition 1 (Fixed Price Dictatorship). Under a fixed price dictatorship, there exists a dictator
i∗ ∈ N and fixed prices ~z ∈ Rm. Given any type profile u ∈ U , one of the dictator’s favorite
alternatives under these prices is selected, i.e. x(u) = a∗ ∈ argmaxa∈A ui∗,a(za), and the dictator
pays ti∗(u) = zx(u).
2.1 Parallel Domains
Given any type of an agent ui ∈ U
0, for each alternative a, we define the willingness to pay pi,a as
the payment for a at which the agent is indifferent between getting a at this payment, and getting
her least preferred alternative ai at zero payment:
pi,a , u
−1
i,a (vi,ai). (3)
See Figure 1. pi,a is the maximum amount the agent can be charged if alternative a is selected,
without violating IR. pi,ai = 0 always holds, and (S1)-(S2) imply that for all a ∈ A, pi,a exists, and
0 ≤ pi,a < +∞.
Definition 2 (Parallel Domain). A utility domain Ui ⊂ U
0 for an agent is a parallel domain if for
all ui ∈ Ui,
ui,a (z + (pi,a− pi,b)) = ui,b(z), ∀a, b ∈ A s.t. vi,a≥vi,b, ∀z ∈[0, pi,b]. (4)
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See Figure 1. We call a ui ∈ U
0 a parallel type if (4) is satisfied. For a parallel type ui, for
a, b ∈ A s.t. vi,a ≥ vi,b, for any utility level w ∈ [vi,ai , vi,b], we have
u−1i,a (w)− u
−1
i,b (w) = pi,a − pi,b = u
−1
i,a (vi,b). (5)
In words, the differences in the payments on a and b in order to achieve w is a constant that
does not depend on w, i.e. the additional amount an agent is willing to pay for a over b does not
depend on how much the agent is charged for b.45 For an agent with parallel type, her marginal
cost for money is the same as long as she has the same utility level, regardless of which alternative
is selected. Intuitively, the trade-off with money depends on how happy the agent is, not how
much she is paying. For example, while paying for a better alternative, an agent with this kind
of wealth effect would care less about money at the same payment amount than compared to a
weaker alternative.
Denote U‖ ⊂ U
0 as the largest parallel domain (i.e. the set of all parallel types), and U‖ =∏n
i=1 U‖. The quasi-linear domain UQL is a parallel domain, where pi,a = vi,a − vi,ai for all a ∈ A
and pi,a − pi,b = vi,a − vi,b for all a, b ∈ A. Another special case of the parallel domain is the linear
parallel domain, where for every ui, there exists α > 0 s.t. ∀a ∈ A and all z ∈ R, ui,a(z) = vi,a−αz
(so the quasi-linear domain is a special case when α = 1). For these two domains, the “vertical”
distances between the utility curves also stay the same (which need not be the case for a general
parallel domain), and the utility functions are horizontal translations of each other everywhere.
A utility domain for an agent Ui ⊆ U
0 is said to have unrestricted willingness to pay if for
any m-dimensional non-negative vector with at least one zero entry, there exists ui ∈ Ui s.t. the
willingness to pay according to ui is equal to this vector element-wise (at least one zero entry is
required since an agent always has zero willingness to pay for ai). Formally, ∀λ ∈ R
m
≥0 for which
∃a ∈ A s.t. λa = 0, there exists ui ∈ Ui s.t. pi,a = λa for all a ∈ A.
6 We call a parallel domain with
unrestricted willingness to pay an unrestricted parallel domain. In particular, UQL is an example
of an unrestricted parallel domain. A utility domain U =
∏n
i=1 Ui is an unrestricted parallel utility
domain if each of the Ui is unrestricted and parallel.
We now prove two lemmas.
Lemma 1. Let (x, t) be a DSIC and deterministic social choice mechanism on a utility domain
U ⊆ U0 with unrestricted willingness to pay. The mechanism satisfies (P4) IR and (P5) No subsidy
if and only if ∀i ∈ N and ∀u−i ∈ U−i, the agent-independent prices {ti,a(u−i)}a∈A satisfy:
(i) ti,a(u−i) ≥ 0 for all alternatives a ∈ A,
(ii) there exists an alternative a ∈ A s.t. ti,a(u−i) = 0.
Thus, the agent-independent prices any agent faces under a mechanism satisfying (P1)-(P5)
must be standard, i.e. the minimum price among all alternatives is zero. We leave the proof of the
lemma to Appendix A.1.
4There is no requirement on the shape of the utility functions below the utility level vi,a
i
= mina∈A vi,a, or where
the payments are negative, since utilities in these ranges are irreverent to the incentive properties of mechanisms that
are IR and satisfy no subsidy. This also implies that the shape of the utility function of the least preferred alternative
is irrelevant, and that when there are only two alternatives the general non quasi-linear domain U0 is parallel.
5Abstracting away the cardinal utility to an agent for an outcome, and modeling instead the prices at which one
alternative is more preferable than another, a type being parallel then requires that in the range of interest, for any
pair of alternatives a, b ∈ A, which one is more preferable depends only on the difference in the prices za − zb.
6There are multiple (actually, infinite number of) types in U0 with the same vector of willingness to pay, and we
only require at least one of them to be included.
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Lemma 2. For any parallel type ui ∈ U‖ and any standard prices {ti,a}a∈A:
(i) ∀a, b ∈ A s.t. 0 ≤ ti,a ≤ pi,a and 0 ≤ ti,b ≤ pi,b,
pi,a − ti,a ≥ pi,b − ti,b ⇔ ui,a(ti,a) ≥ ui,b(ti,b).
(ii) argmaxa∈A{ui,a(ti,a)} = argmaxa∈A{pi,a − ti,a}.
Proof. We first prove part (i). Assume w.l.o.g that vi,a ≥ vi,b. We know from the monotonicity of
ui,a and the definition of parallel domain (4) that
pi,a − ti,a ≥ pi,b − ti,b ⇔ ti,a ≤ ti,b + pi,a − pi,b
⇔ui,a(ti,a) ≥ ui,a(ti,b + (pi,a − pi,b))⇔ ui,a(ti,a) ≥ ui,b(ti,b).
For part (ii), observe that if the price for at least one of the alternatives is zero, the highest utility
at the given prices among all alternatives maxa∈A{ui,a(ti,a)} is at least mina∈A ui,a(0) = mina∈A vi,a.
Therefore, for any alternative a ∈ A s.t. ti,a > pi,a, the alternative cannot be agent-maximizing.
Among the alternatives s.t. ti,a ≤ pi,a, the agent-maximizing alternative(s) coincides with the
maximizer(s) of pi,a − ti,a, according to part (i).
Thus, in a parallel domain, the agent-maximizing alternative given standard prices is the max-
imizer of the difference between the willingness to pay and the price: pi,a − ti,a. As a result, the
willingness to pay serves similar roles as values in the quasi-linear domain, and it is this connection
that enables us to generalize Roberts’ theorem to unrestricted parallel domains.
3 The Generalized Weighted VCG Mechanism
We prove in this section a positive result, that in parallel domains, the generalized weighted VCG
mechanisms implement in dominant strategy any affine maximizer of willingness to pay: x(u) ∈
argmaxa∈A {
∑n
i=1 kipi,a + Ca} , for non-negative weights {k1}i∈N , and real constants {Ca}a∈A.
Definition 3 (Generalized Weighted VCG). The generalized weighted VCGmechanism, parametrized
by non-negative weights {ki}i∈N and real constants {Ca}a∈A, collects a type profile uˆ = (uˆ1, . . . , uˆn)
from agents, and computes the willingness to pay pˆi,a = uˆ
−1
i,a (mina′∈A vˆi,a′). It is defined as
• Choice rule: x(uˆ) = a∗, where a∗ ∈ argmaxa∈A
{∑
i∈N kipˆi,a + Ca
}
, breaking ties arbitrarily,
independent to agents’ reports.
• Payment rule: ti(uˆ) = 0 for i ∈ N s.t. ki = 0; for i s.t. ki 6= 0:
ti(uˆ) =
1
ki

∑
j 6=i
kj pˆj,a∗−i + Ca∗−i −
∑
j 6=i
kj pˆj,a∗ − Ca∗

 , (6)
where a∗−i ∈ argmaxa∈A{
∑
j 6=i kj pˆj,a +Ca}.
Theorem 1. With type domain U ⊆ U‖, any non-negative coefficients {ki}i∈N and any real con-
stants {Ca}a∈A, the generalized weighted VCG mechanism is DISC, IR and does not make positive
transfers to the agents.
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Proof. We first consider an agent i ∈ N s.t. ki > 0. Given u−i, we can check that for any ui agent
i reports s.t. x(ui, u−i) = a, agent i’s agent-independent payment would be
ti,a(u−i) =
1
ki

∑
j 6=i
kjpj,a∗−i +Ca∗−i −
∑
j 6=i
kjpj,a − Ca

 . (7)
For agent i s.t. ki = 0, argmaxa∈A{
∑
j∈N kjpj,a+Ca} and argmaxa∈A{
∑
j 6=i kjpj,a+Ca} coincide.
No matter what agent i reports, a∗−i = a
∗ is always selected and she does not pay anything, thus
ti,a∗−i(u−i) = 0 and ti,a(u−i) = +∞ for a 6= a
∗
−i. (8)
Since a∗−i is the maximizer of
∑
j 6=i kjpj,a+Ca, all agent-independent prices are non-negative. More-
over, a∗−i has the minimum price among all alternatives, which is exactly zero: mina∈A{ti,a(u−i)} =
ti,a∗−i(u−i) = 0. By Lemma 1, we know that the prices are standard, and the mechanism satisfies
(P4) IR and (P5) No subsidy if it is DSIC. What is left to prove is choosing a∗ at such agent-
independent prices is agent-maximizing for all agents, which implies DSIC. From Lemma 2 we
know that we only need to prove a∗ is the maximizer of pi,a − ti,a(u−i) for all agents. This is
immediate for agents with ki = 0. For an agent with ki > 0, for any alternative a ∈ A, we have
pi,a∗ − ti,a∗(u−i)− (pi,a − ti,a(u−i))
=pi,a∗ −
1
ki

∑
j 6=i
kjpj,a∗−i + Ca∗−i −
∑
j 6=i
kjpj,a∗ − Ca∗


− pi,a +
1
ki

∑
j 6=i
kjpj,a∗−i + Ca∗−i −
∑
j 6=i
kjpj,a − Ca


=
1
ki

∑
j∈N
kjpj,a∗ + Ca∗ −
∑
j∈N
kjpj,a −Ca

 ≥ 0,
thus a∗ indeed maximizes pi,a − ti,a(u−i).
Note that when U ⊆ UQL, we have pi,a = vi,a − vi,ai for all a ∈ A, i ∈ N , and maximizing
an affine function of the willingness to pay is equivalent to maximizing the same affine function of
the values. Thus, this mechanism coincides with the weighted VCG mechanisms when utilities are
quasi-linear. Ontoness is satisfied if ki > 0 for at least one agent and when the utility domain is
unrestricted.
4 Generalizing Roberts’ Theorem
With quasi-linear utilities, Roberts [1979] showed that with three or more alternatives, if each
agent’s value for each alternative can be any real number, the choice rule of any social choice
mechanism that is (P1) DISC, (P2) deterministic and (P3) onto must be a maximizer of some
affine function of agents’ values. With two additional conditions, (P4) IR and (P5) No subsidy, we
generalize Roberts’ theorem to the unrestricted parallel domains.
Theorem 2 (Roberts’ Theorem on Parallel Domains). With three or more alternatives and an
unrestricted parallel utility domain U , for every social choice mechanism satisfying (P1)-(P5), there
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exist non-negative weights k1, . . . , kn (not all equal to zero) and real constants C1, . . . , Cm such that
for all u ∈ U ,
x(u) ∈ argmax
a∈A
{
n∑
i=1
kipi,a + Ca
}
.
We prove in Lemma 3 that the weak monotonicity condition defined in terms of willingness
to pay (which is eqivalent to the W-Mon condition in terms of values [Bikhchandani et al., 2006]
when utilities are quasi-linear, see Definition 4) is a necessary condition of incentive compatibility.
Following the same steps as in the first proof of Roberts’ theorem presented in Lavi et al. [2009]
while treating willingness to pay as “values” in the proof, we conclude that affine maximizers of
the willingness to pay are the only implementable choice rules (see Appendix A.2 for the details).
The coefficients {ki}i∈N cannot be all zero in order to satisfy (P3) Ontoness.
Regarding the requirements on the utility domain: in the proof of Robert’s theorem [Lavi et al.,
2009], the values can take any real numbers, whereas the willingness to pay for a non quasi-linear
type takes non-negative values and one of them has to be exactly zero. This does not prevent us
from generalizing the proof, since what is necessary is that the differences in the values vi,a − vi,b
for all a, b ∈ A can be any real numbers. We get this from the unrestricted parallel domain.
Definition 4 (Weak Monotonicity). Let U =
∏n
i=1 Ui ⊆ U
0 be a utility domain. A choice rule
x : U → A satisfies weak monotonicity (W-Mon) if for all u−i ∈ U−i and all ui, u
′
i ∈ Ui,
x(ui, u−i) = a, x(u
′
i, u−i) = b⇒ p
′
i,b − pi,b ≥ p
′
i,a − pi,a.
In words, W-Mon in a parallel domain means that if alternative a is selected under (ui, u−i)
and alternative b is selected under (u′i, u−i), the additional willingness to pay for b comparing with
a according to u′i, i.e. p
′
i,b − p
′
i,a, must be at least as big as the additional willingness to pay for b
comparing with a according to ui: pi,b − pi,a. This is a generalization of the W-Mon condition in
terms of values as defined in [Bikhchandani et al., 2006], and the two are equivalent when utilities
are quasi-linear, in which case pi,a − pi,b = vi,a − vi,b holds for all a, b ∈ A.
Lemma 3. With any parallel utility domain U ⊆ U‖, every social choice mechanism satisfying
(P1), (P2), (P4) and (P5) must satisfy W-Mon.
Proof. Consider two types ui, u
′
i and a social choice mechanism (x, t) s.t. x(u) = a and x(u
′
i, u−i) =
b. We know from agent-maximization and Lemma 2 that facing prices {ti,a′(u−i)}a′∈A, alternative
a must be a maximizer of pi,a′ − ti,a′(u−i) according to ui, and alternative b must be a maximizer
of p′i,a′ − ti,a′(u−i) according to u
′
i. Thus, pi,a − ti,a(u−i) ≥ pi,b − ti,b(u−i) and p
′
i,b − ti,b(u−i) ≥
p′i,a− ti,a(u−i) must hold. Adding both sides of the two inequalities we get pi,a+ p
′
i,b ≥ pi,b+ p
′
i,a ⇒
p′i,b − pi,b ≥ p
′
i,a − pi,a.
5 Impossibility results
We now state the main result in this paper.
Theorem 3 (Dictatorship). With at least three alternatives and a utility domain U =
∏n
i=1 Ui s.t.
(C1) for each i ∈ N , Ui contains an unrestricted parallel domain,
(C2) for at least n− 1 agents, Ui 6⊂ U‖,
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the only social choice mechanisms that satisfy (P1)-(P5) are fixed price dictatorships.
The quasi-linear domain is unrestricted and parallel, thus a special case of the theorem can be
stated as: on any utility domain containing UQL, if the utility domains of at least n − 1 agents
contain non-parallel types, the only mechanisms satisfying (P1)-(P5) are fixed price dictatorships.
We provide here an outline of the proof and leave the full version to Appendix A.3.
Given any mechanism (x, t) with (P1)-(P5) on a utility domain U satisfying (C1) and (C2),
we prove that the restriction of the mechanism on the parallel subspace U˜ , U ∩ U‖ must also
satisfy (P1)-(P5). Theorem 2 then implies that on U˜ , the choice rule x must be the maximizer of
some affine function of agents’ willingness to pay. Fixing the choice rule, agent-independence and
agent-maximization determine the agent-independent prices up to a constant (when there is no tie),
and the requirement that prices being standard fully pins down {ti,a(u−i)}a∈A as (7) and (8) for
all i ∈ N and any u−i s.t. ui′ is parallel for all i
′ 6= i. Theorem 2 requires that there exists at least
one agent with a non-zero coefficient ki. If the number of agents for whom ki > 0 is more than
one, Ui 6⊂ U‖ for at least one of them. Assume w.l.o.g. that k1, k2 > 0 and ∃u
∗
2 ∈ U2\U‖. Fixing
some parallel type profile of the rest of the agents u∗−1,−2, {t1,a(u
∗
2, u
∗
−1,−2)}a∈A are not yet pinned
down by the above mentioned characterization since u∗2 is not parallel. We prove that no agent-
independent price {t1,a(u
∗
2, u
∗
−1,−2)}a∈A guarantees that an alternative that is agent-maximizing for
all agents always exists for all economies (u1, u
∗
2, u
∗
−1,−2) where u1 ∈ U1. This contradicts DSIC.
Now we know that there exists exactly one agent (say i∗) with a non-zero coefficient. This
implies that when the reported profile is parallel (i.e. u ∈ U ∩ U‖), the outcome of the mechanism
must be determined according to a fixed price dictatorship. By induction on the number of agents
whose type is not parallel, we then prove that for any u ∈ U , the outcome must also be determined
by the same fixed price dictatorship.
On the Tightness of the Negative Result That the utility domain U contains an unrestricted
parallel domain is necessary for Theorem 2. If the number of agents that has a type outside of
the parallel domain is smaller than n − 1, there are at least two agents whose types are always
parallel. The generalized weighted VCG mechanism with ki > 0 only for these agents would satisfy
all (P1)-(P5), and still would not be a dictatorship.
Regarding the properties (P1)-(P5), the mechanism being (P1) DSIC and (P2) deterministic
are trivially necessary. (P3) ontoness is required, since if some alternatives are never selected, the
number of alternatives can be effectively reduced to two, in which case all types satisfying (S1) and
(S2) are parallel, thus even for the most general U0, any generalized weighted VCG mechanism
with coefficients not all zero satisfies (P1)-(P5).
The conditions on the utility domain (C1) and (C2) in the statement of Theorem 3 require only a
small deviation from quasi-linearity or the parallel domain. As an example, with n = 1 and m = 3,
the type domain U1 = UQL and U2 = UQL ∪ {u
∗
2} for any u
∗
2 /∈ U‖ (e.g. as illustrated in Figure 2)
satisfies both (C1) and (C2). Assuming only (C1) and (C2), truthful mechanisms that violate one or
both of (P4) and (P5) may still exist. For the above described utility domain, the mechanism which
always adds 1 to agent 2’s payment but otherwise functions exactly as a generalized weighted VCG
mechanism satisfies (P1)-(P3) and (P5). More detailed discussions are provided in Appendix A.4,
and we present an alternative impossibility result assuming only (P1)-(P3) in Section 5.1.
Note that Theorem 5 does not rely on any efficiency assumption. Replacing ontoness by Pareto-
efficiency, we can prove a similar dictatorship result which instead of (C2), requires that only a
single agent has a single non-parallel type. See Theorem 5 in Appendix B.
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zu2,a′(z)
1
u∗2,a(z)
u∗2,b(z)
u∗2,c(z)
v2,a
v2,b
v2,c
Figure 2: An example non-parallel type u∗2 of agent 2.
On the Fixed Price Dictatorship In a fixed price dictatorship, the dictator may still be asked
to make some non-zero payments. It is clear that such a mechanism is DSIC, and when the prices
that the dictator faces are standard, it is also IR and never pays the agents. In order to replace the
fixed-price dictatorship in Theorem 3 with full dictatorship, i.e. the dictator chooses her favorite
alternative free of charge, we can impose another condition, voluntary participation (VP), which
means any agent can choose to walk away from the mechanism and accept the alternative decided
by the rest of the agents without having to make any payment. If the dictator is charged a positive
fixed price za > 0 for some alternative a ∈ A, and a is still the dictator’s favorite choice under the
fixed prices, then when a is selected by the sub-economy without the dictator (which should be the
case for some u−i∗ given onto-ness), the dictator would have the incentive to walk away, in which
case a will be selected and the dictator pays 0. This contradicts VP.
VP is stronger than IR. To see this, note that IR requires that for every agent at least one of
the prices is weakly below the agent’s willingness to pay. On the other hand, VP requires that the
mechanism is well defined for any economy of n−1 agents and satisfy the same properties, moreover,
each agent must face a zero-price for the alternative that would be selected in the sub-economy
without her.
Regarding the payments from the rest of the agents— when the dictator strictly prefers a single
alternative a ∈ A (i.e. ∀a′ 6= a, ui∗,a′(za′) < ui∗,a(za)), the rest of the agents do not make any
payment: ti(u) = 0 for all i 6= i
∗. In the degenerate case where | argmaxa∈A ui∗,a(za)| > 1, i.e.
the dictator is indifferent toward multiple best alternatives, some or all the rest of the agents may
be charged a non-zero payment to break ties among the dictator’s favorite alternatives (e.g., we
could run a generalized VCG mechanism between two alternatives that are tied from the dictator’s
perspective), and this may still satisfy (P1)-(P5). See Appendix A.3.
5.1 Relaxing IR and No Subsidy
We show in the rest of the section that with more richness in non quasi-linearity (e.g. with the
linear domain with two slopes defined below), the dictatorship result remains given only (P1)-(P3).
Definition 5 (Linear Domain with Two Slopes). Ui is a linear domain with two slopes if there
exists αi, βi > 0, αi 6= βi s.t. for all ui ∈ Ui, ∀a ∈ A, either ui(z) = vi,a − αiz for all z ∈ R or
ui(z) = vi,a − βiz for all ∀z ∈ R.
We say a linear domain with two slopes Ui is unrestricted if for each i ∈ N , the values {vi,a}
can be any real numbers, and the slopes of utility functions for different alternatives can be any
combination of αi and βi.
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Theorem 4. With at least three alternatives and a utility domain U =
∏n
i=1 Ui s.t. for each i ∈ N ,
Ui contains an unrestricted linear domain with two slopes, a social choice mechanism satisfying
(P1)-(P3) must be a fixed price dictatorship.
Intuitively, each Ui contains as a sub-domain an unrestricted linear parallel domain (e.g. the
set of ui s.t. ui,a(z) = vi,a − αiz for all z ∈ R and all a ∈ A), which is a special case of a strictly
parallel domain. For strictly parallel domains, with only (P1)-(P3), we can generalize Roberts’
Theorem, and still determine the agent-independent prices up to a constant. We then prove that
if more than one agent has a positive coefficient in the choice rule, the induced agent-independent
prices will result in contradictions when an agent’s utility domain consists of utility functions with
mixed slopes. Then we can prove by induction that the only agent with a positive coefficient must
be a fixed price dictator. See Appendix A.4.1 for the full proof.
The theorem still holds if αi = α, βi = β for all i. Moreover, we would reach the same result if
the αi’s and βi’s are known to the mechanism designer. Since the αi’s and the βi’s can be arbitrarily
close, this theorem shows that very slight disturbances on the slopes of agents’ utility functions is
sufficient to rule out the existence of truthful non-dictatorial mechanisms.
6 Conclusions
The existence of truthful and non-dictatorial social choice mechanisms strongly depends on whether
monetary transfers are allowed. The seminal Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem proves that without
payments, the only truthful and onto mechanisms are dictatorial, whereas for the (rather restrictive)
quasi-linear utility domain, any affine maximizer of agent values can be implemented if payments
are allowed. We study social choice with payments and general utilities, distinguish types being
parallel as the central property of quasi-linearity for DSIC mechanisms to exist, generalize (with
additional conditions IR and No subsidy) Roberts’ theorem to parallel domains with unrestricted
willingness to pay, and provide a tight characterization of the largest parallel domain. Within the
largest parallel domain, the generalized weighted VCG mechanisms implement any affine maximizer
of agents’ willingness to pay, and satisfy DSIC, onto, deterministic, IR and do not make payments
to agents. Adding any non-parallel type to an unrestricted parallel domain, the only mechanisms
with the above properties are dictatorial. We also discuss utility domains that are richer in their
non quasi-linearity but still deviate very slightly from the quasi-linear domain, for which individual
rationality and no subsidy can be relaxed and the dictatorship result remains.
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A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Lemma 1. Let (x, t) be a DSIC and deterministic social choice mechanism on a utility domain
U ⊆ U0 with unrestricted willingness to pay. The mechanism satisfies (P4) IR and (P5) No subsidy
if and only if ∀i ∈ N and ∀u−i ∈ U−i, the agent-independent prices {ti,a(u−i)}a∈A satisfy:
(i) ti,a(u−i) ≥ 0 for all alternatives a ∈ A,
(ii) there exists an alternative a ∈ A s.t. ti,a(u−i) = 0.
Proof. We first prove parts (i) and (ii) given (P4) and (P5). Assume part (i) does not hold, that
there exists u−i and a ∈ A s.t. ti,a(u−i) < 0. Consider u1 s.t. a = a¯i. In any agent-maximizing
mechanism, the agent is guaranteed utility at least ui,a(ti,a(u−i)) > maxa′∈A vi,a′ , which is not
possible without the mechanism making a positive payment to the agent, and this violates (P5).
Now we only need to prove that it cannot be the case that ti,a(u−i) > 0 for all a ∈ A. This
is obvious, since if otherwise, there exists ui ∈ Ui for whom pi,a < ti,a(u−i) for all a ∈ A thus
maxa∈A ui,a(ti,a(u−i)) < mina∈A vi,a, in which case (P4) is violated.
We now prove the other direction. Given part (i), it is obvious that no matter which alternative
is selected, the transfer from any agent to the mechanism is non-negative thus (P5) holds. Given
(ii), we know that the agent’s minimum possible utility under an agent-maximizing mechanism is
vi,a, which is at least mina′∈A vi,a′ , thus (P4) holds.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 2
Theorem 2 (Roberts’ Theorem on Parallel Domains). With three or more alternatives and an
unrestricted parallel utility domain U , for every social choice mechanism satisfying (P1)-(P5), there
exist non-negative weights k1, . . . , kn (not all equal to zero) and real constants C1, . . . , Cm such that
for all u ∈ U ,
x(u) ∈ argmax
a∈A
{
n∑
i=1
kipi,a + Ca
}
.
We had proved in Lemma 3 that W-Mon is a necessary condition for (P1)-(P5) if the utility
domain is unrestricted and parallel. We provide here a few more steps where the details differ
slightly for values and willingness to pay, following the first proof presented in Lavi et al. [2009],
however, the high level ideas are the same.
Definition 6 (Positive Association of Differences). A social choice function x on a parallel domain
U satisfies positive association of differences (PAD) if: for all u and u′ in U , if x(u) = a and
p′i,a − pi,a > p
′
i,b − pi,b for all b 6= a and all i ∈ N , then it must be the case that x(u
′) = a, as well.
Lemma 4 (IC ⇒ PAD). A social choice mechanism on an unrestricted parallel domain U with
(P1), (P2), (P4) and (P5) satisfies PAD.
Proof. By Lemma 3, x must satisfy W-Mon. Let u, u′ ∈ U be type profiles such that x(u) = a
and p′i,a − pi,a > p
′
i,b − pi,b for all b 6= a and all i ∈ N . We need to show that x(u
′) = a. Denote
u(ℓ) = (u′1, . . . , u
′
ℓ, uℓ+1, . . . , un). We know x(u
(0)) = x(u) = a. Assume x(u(ℓ−1)) = a for some
ℓ > 0, we show by contradiction that x(u(ℓ)) = a must also hold. By induction, this implies that
x(u′) = x(u(n)) = a.
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Assume that there exists ℓ ≥ 0 and b 6= a s.t. x(u(ℓ−1)) = a but x(u(ℓ)) = b 6= a. Since all players
except player ℓ have the same type in u(ℓ−1) and in u(ℓ), we get by W-Mon that p′ℓ,b−pℓ,b ≥ p
′
ℓ,a−pℓ,a,
which contradicts the PAD assumption on u′ and u. Thus, x(u(ℓ)) = a must hold. This completes
the proof of the induction step.
We now prove the result analogous to Claim 1 in Lavi et al. [2009].
Claim 1. Assume a choice rule x on an unrestricted parallel domain U satisfies PAD. Fix type
profiles u, u′ ∈ U s.t. x(u′) = a. If p′i,b − pi,b > p
′
i,a − pi,a holds for all i ∈ N for some b ∈ A, then
x(u) 6= b.
Proof. We follow the same proof as in Lavi et al. [2009], and prove this claim by contradiction. The
construction differs slightly from the original proof since the willingness to pay is always normalized
s.t. the an agent’s smallest willingness to pay among all alternatives is zero.
Suppose by contradiction that x(u) = b. For each i ∈ N , denote δi , p
′
i,b − p1,b − (p
′
i,a − pi,a).
We know that δi > 0 for all i ∈ N , and in addition, pi,a− p
′
i,a− δi/2 = pi,b− p
′
i,b+ δi/2 > pi,b− p
′
i,b.
Consider p˜ s.t. for all i ∈ N ,
˜pi,a =pi,a − δi/2,
˜pi,b =pi,b,
and for c ∈ A s.t. c 6= a, b,
p˜i,c = min{pi,c, p
′
i,c + pi,a − p
′
i,a} − δi.
Then, let p′′ be the normalized version of p˜, i.e.
p′′i,c , ˜pi,c −min
d∈A
{ ˜pi,d}, ∀i ∈ N, ∀c ∈ A.
First, we observe that minc∈A{p
′′
i,c} = 0 holds for all i ∈ N , i.e. p
′′ is a valid set of willingness
to pay for the agents. Since U is unrestricted, we can find u′′ ∈ U where agents’ willingness to
pay is given by p′′. Second, observe that for all i ∈ N and any pair of alternatives c, d ∈ A,
p′′i,c − p
′′
i,d = ˜pi,c − ˜pi,d.
We now show that the PAD condition from u→ u′′ results in x(u′′) = b, whereas applying PAD
condition from u′ → u′′ results in x(u′′) = a, thus a contraction.
To show x(u′′) = b must hold, observe that for all i ∈ N ,
p′′i,b − pi,b − (p
′′
i,a − pi,a) = ˜pi,b − ˜pi,a − (pi,b − pi,a)
=pi,b − pi,a + δi/2− (pi,b − pi,a) = δi/2 > 0,
and that for all c 6= a, b,
p′′i,b − pi,b − (p
′′
i,c − pi,c) = ˜pi,b − ˜pi,c − (pi,b − pi,c)
≥pi,b − pi,c + δi − (pi,b − pi,c) = δi > 0.
From Lemma 4, we know that x(u′′) = b must hold. Similarly, to show x(u′′) = a must hold, we
can check that for all i ∈ N ,
p′′i,b − p
′
i,b − (p
′′
i,a − p
′
i,a) = ˜pi,b − ˜pi,a − (p
′
i,b − p
′
i,a)
=pi,b − pi,a − (p
′
i,b − p
′
i,a) + δi/2 = −δi/2 < 0,
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and that for all c 6= a, b,
p′′i,c − p
′
i,c − (p
′′
i,a − p
′
i,a) = ˜pi,c − ˜pi,a − (p
′
i,c − p
′
i,a)
≤p′i,c + pi,a − p
′
i,a − δi − (pi,a − δi/2) − (p
′
i,c − p
′
i,a) = −δi/2 < 0.
Lemma 4 then implies x(u′′) = a must hold.
We now consider the same sets that are analyzed in Lavi et al. [2009] in the first proof for
Roberts’ theorem, however, we define these sets in terms of differences in willingness to pay instead
of differences in values. Let U be an unrestricted parallel domain. For all tuples (a, b) ∈ A×A that
a 6= b:
P (a, b) , {α ∈ Rn | ∃u ∈ U s.t. pa − pb = α and x(u) = a}
The two immediate properties of the sets under quasi-linearity also holds:
1. For every a and b, the set P (a, b) is not empty, as long as the choice rule x is onto.
2. If α ∈ P (a, b), then for any positive δ ∈ Rn s.t. δi > 0 for all i, α + δ ∈ P (a, b). To see this,
note that α ∈ P (a, b) implies that there exists u s.t. x(u) = a and pa − pb = α. Now we look
for another type profile u′ ∈ U s.t. comparing with u, we are increasing pa by δ, while keeping
the other willingness to pay the same. We know from PAD that x(u′) = a must still hold, and
in this case p′a − p
′
b = α+ δ ∈ P (a, b) as required.
We now prove the following claim, which is analogous to Claim 2 in Lavi et al. [2009]. Without
otherwise specify, the claims in the rest of this section assumes that there are three or more
alternatives, that the utility domain is parallel and unrestricted, and that the mechanism satisfies
(P1)-(P5).
Claim 2. For every α, ǫ ∈ Rn , ǫ > 0:
1. α− ǫ ∈ P (a, b)⇒ −α /∈ P (b, a).
2. α /∈ P (a, b)⇒ −α ∈ P (a, b).
Proof. For the first part, note that α−ǫ ∈ P (a, b) implies that there exists u′ ∈ U s.t. p′a−p
′
b = α−ǫ
and x(u′) = a. Now let u ∈ U be any type profile s.t. pb − pa = −α. We know that for all i ∈ N ,
pi,a − pi,b = αi > αi − ǫ = p
′
i,a − p
′
i,b. This implies p
′
i,b − pi,b > p
′
i,a − pi,a for all i ∈ N , and we get
x(u) 6= b by applying Claim 1. This shows that for all u ∈ U s.t. pb− pa = −α, x(u) 6= b, therefore
−α /∈ P (b, a).
For the second part, for any c 6= a, b, take some βc ∈ P (a, c) and fix some ǫ > 0. Choose any u
s.t. pa − pb = α and pa − pc = βc + ǫ for all c 6= a, b. Since px − pb = α 6= P (a, b), we know that
x(u) 6= a. For all alternatives c 6= a, b, from Claim 1 and the fact that ∃u′ s.t. p′a − p
′
c = βc and
x(u′) = a, we know that x(u) = c cannot hold. It follows that x(u) = b, thus ∃u s.t. pb − pa = −α
s.t. x(u) = b, thus −α ∈ P (b, a).
Intuitively, part 1 means that if for some u s.t. pa − pb = α − ǫ, x(u) = a, it must be the case
that for all u s.t. pa − pb = α, x(u) 6= b. This is because if a is selected under pa − pb = α − ǫ,
when the difference in the willingness to pay for a vs. b increases by ǫ thus becomes larger, a still
dominates b thus b cannot be selected.
Part 2 means that if for all u s.t. pa − pb = α, x(u) 6= a, then there exists some u s.t.
pa− pb = α and x(u) = b. This can be proved by constructing a type s.t. the willingness to pay for
all alternatives other than a and b in a way that they are all dominated by a so cannot be selected,
leaving b to be the only alternative that can be selected.
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Claim 3. For every α, β, ǫ(α), ǫ(β) ∈ Rn, ǫ(α), ǫ(β) > 0:
α− ǫ(α) ∈P (a, b), β− ǫ(β) ∈P (b, c)⇒α+β−
ǫ(α)+ ǫ(β)
2
∈ P (a, c).
Proof. Choose any u ∈ U s.t. pa− pb = α− ǫ
(α)/2 and pb− pc = β− ǫ
(β)/2. We know from Claim 1
that x(u) 6= b and x(u) 6= c. If the total number of alternatives is more than three, then for all
d 6= a, b, c, fix some δ(w) ∈ P (a, d) and some ǫ ∈ Rn, ǫ > 0, and let pa − pd = δ
(w) + ǫ. Again by
Claim 1, we know that x(u) 6= d. Therefore x(u) = amust hold, and therefore α+β−(ǫ(α)+ǫ(β))/2 ∈
P (a, c).
With the same argument as in the proof for quasi-linear Roberts’ theorem, we know that if
~0 ∈ P (a, b) for all pairs (a, b) ∈ A × A, then the interior of all P (a, b) must be equal. However,
P (a, b) does not necessarily include ~0 thus needs to be “shifted” to contain this point. We can
similarly define
γ(x, y) = inf{q ∈ R | q ·~1 ∈ P (a, b)}.
It is easy to see that the infimum exists. We first argue that the set is not empty. Given that the
social choice rule is onto, we can find some u ∈ U s.t. x(u) = a. Let q = maxi{pi,a − pi,b} and find
u′ s.t. p′i,j = pi,j for all i and j 6= a, and p
′
i,a = pi,b+ q for all i. We know from PAD that x(u
′) = a
must still hold, thus this shows that q ·~1 ∈ P (a, b) thus the set is non-empty. To show that the set
of q’s is lower-bounded, observe that if this is not the case, the corresponding set P (b, a) would be
empty, which contradicts ontoness.
The rest of the proof in Lavi et al. [2009] for Roberts’ theorem for quasi-linear utility domains
analyzes of the sets P (a, b) given the above lemmas and claims. Since these analysis does not
depend on the values or the utility functions, the same identical arguments follow through for the
parallel domain. This completes the proof of the Robert’s theorem on unrestricted parallel domains.
A.3 Proof of Theorem 3
Theorem 3 (Dictatorship). With at least three alternatives and a utility domain U =
∏n
i=1 Ui s.t.
(C1) for each i ∈ N , Ui contains an unrestricted parallel domain,
(C2) for at least n− 1 agents, Ui 6⊂ U‖,
the only social choice mechanisms that satisfy (P1)-(P5) are fixed price dictatorships.
Before proving the main theorem, we first prove two lemmas. The following first lemma provides
a characterization of agent-independent prices for mechanisms that satisfy (P1)-(P5).
Lemma 5. Fix any social choice mechanism on an unrestricted parallel domain U with choice
rule x(u) ∈ argmaxa∈A
∑
i∈N kipi,a +Ca, ∀u ∈ U . If the mechanism satisfies (P1)-(P5), the agent-
independent prices are determined by:
(i) for i ∈ N s.t. ki > 0, for any u−i ∈ U−i, let a
∗
−i ∈ argmaxa∈A
∑
j 6=i kjpj,a + Ca, we have
ti,a(u−i) = 1/ki(
∑
j 6=i kjpj,a∗−i + Ca∗−i −
∑
j 6=i kjpj,a − Ca) for all a ∈ A.
(ii) for i ∈ N s.t. ki = 0, for any u−i ∈ U−i, s.t. there exists a
∗
−i ∈ A that satisfies
∑
j 6=i kjpj,a +
Ca <
∑
j 6=i kjpj,a∗+Ca∗ for all a 6= a
∗
−i, we have ti,a∗−i(u−i) = 0 and ti,a(u−i) = +∞, ∀a 6= a
∗
−i.
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In other words, for agents s.t. ki 6= 0, and for agents s.t. ki = 0 but when there is no tie in the
choice rule, the agent-independent prices must be determined by (7) and (8). As a consequence,
when there is no tie, the outcome of the mechanism must be the same as that under the generalized
weighted VCG mechanism.
Proof. Fix the choice rule as x(u) ∈ argmaxa∈A
∑n
i=1 kipi,a + Ca, ∀u ∈ U for some non-negative
coefficients {ki}i∈N and real constants {Ca}a∈A.
Part (i): Consider any agent i ∈ N s.t. ki > 0. For all u−i ∈ U−i, for any two alternatives a, b ∈ A,
there exists ui ∈ Ui such that both
∑
j∈N kjpj,a + Ca >
∑
j∈N kjpj,c + Cc and
∑
j∈N kjpj,b + Cb >∑
j∈N kjpj,c+Cc hold, since Ui is unrestricted and ki > 0. We know from the choice rule that only
alternatives a and b can be selected, and a is selected if
∑
j∈N
kjpj,a + Ca >
∑
j∈N
kjpj,b +Cb ⇔ pi,a − pi,b >
1
ki

∑
j 6=i
kjpj,b + Cb −
∑
j 6=i
kjpj,a − Ca

 . (9)
From Lemma 2, we also know that agent-maximization requires that a cannot be selected if
pi,a − ti,a(u−i) < pi,b − ti,b(u−i)⇔ pi,a − pi,b < ti,a(u−i)− ti,b(u−i). (10)
If the differences in the agent-independent prices satisfies ti,a(u−i) − ti,b(u−i) >
1
ki
(
∑
j 6=i kjpj,b +
Cb −
∑
j 6=i kjpj,a − Ca), there exists ui ∈ Ui s.t. pi,a − pi,b ∈ (
1
ki
(
∑
j 6=i kjpj,b + Cb −
∑
j 6=i kjpj,a −
Ca), ti,a(u−i)−ti,b(u−i)) in which case both (9) and (10) hold. This is a contradiction. Similarly, we
can show that it cannot be the case that ti,a(u−i)− ti,b(u−i) <
1
ki
t(
∑
j 6=i kjpj,b+Cb−
∑
j 6=i kjpj,a−
Ca), thus the price difference must be
ti,a(u−i)− ti,b(u−i) =
1
ki

∑
j 6=i
kjpj,b + Cb −
∑
j 6=i
kjpj,a − Ca

 . (11)
Since the choice of a and b are arbitrary, all prices are pinned-down up to a constant, given
that the differences between any pair of prices are determined. Now observe ti,a(u−i) is smaller if∑
j 6=i kjpj,a+Ca is larger. From Lemma 1 we know that all prices must be non-negative, and that
one of the prices must be zero, thus ti,a∗−i(u−i), the smallest of all, must be exactly zero. Therefore
we get:
ti,a∗−i(u−i) = 0 =
1
ki

∑
j 6=i
kjpj,a∗−i + Ca∗−i −
∑
j 6=i
kjpj,a∗−i − Ca∗−i

 ,
and
ti,a(u−i) =ti,a∗−i +
1
ki

∑
j 6=i
kjpj,a∗−i + Ca∗−i −
∑
j 6=i
kjpj,a − Ca


=
1
ki

∑
j 6=i
kjpj,a∗−i + Ca∗−i −
∑
j 6=i
kjpj,a − Ca

 .
Part (ii): Now consider i ∈ N s.t. ki = 0. For all u−i ∈ U−i such that ∃a
∗
−i ∈ A that satisfies
∀a 6= a∗−i,
∑
j 6=i kjpj,a + Ca <
∑
j 6=i kjpj,a∗ + Ca∗ , we know that no type of agent i in the parallel
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domain ui ∈ U‖ will result in x(ui, u−i) = a for a 6= a
∗
−i. Therefore alternative a cannot be the
unique agent-maximizing alternative for any ui ∈ Ui, which implies ti,a(u−i) = +∞ must hold.
Now we know from Lemma 1 that ti,a∗−i(u−i) = 0 must be true, since one of the prices must be
zero.
Given a utility domain U =
∏n
i=1 Ui, denote the parallel sub-domain of each agent i ∈ N as
U˜i , Ui ∩ U‖, and let U˜ , U ∩ U‖ be the subspace of U containing all parallel type profiles. If
the utility domain U satisfies (C1), i.e. when Ui contains an unrestricted parallel domain, then
each of the U˜i is an unrestricted parallel domain, and U˜ is also unrestricted. For any social choice
mechanism (x, t) on U , we show that its restriction on U˜ must inherit its good properties.
Lemma 6. Fix any social choice mechanism (x, t) under (P1)-(P3) on a utility domain U that
satisfies (C1). The restriction of (x, t) on the parallel subdomain U˜ = U ∩ U‖ also satisfies (P1)-
(P3). Moreover, if (x, t) also satisfies (P4) and (P5), then (P4) and (P5) are also satisfied by its
restriction on U˜ .
Proof. For any mechanism that satisfies (P1)-(P3), it is immediate that (P1) DSIC (P2) determin-
istic must also hold for its restriction on any subdomain. Similarly, for a mechanism with (P1)-(P5),
its restriction on any subdomain must also satisfy (P4) IR and (P5) no subsidy. What is left to
show is that any mechanism that with (P1)-(P3) on a domain U that satisfies condition (C1), its
restriction on U˜ must also be onto. Assume toward a contradiction, that there exists a∗ ∈ A s.t.
∀u ∈ U˜ , x(u) 6= a∗. We prove by induction that the following statement holds for all ℓ ≤ n− 1:
Fℓ: ∀i ∈ N , ∀u−i ∈ U−i such that |{i
′ ∈ N | i′ 6= i, ui′ /∈ U˜i}| ≤ ℓ, we have ti,a∗(u−i) =∞.
This implies that a∗ cannot be the agent-maximizing alternative for any agent under any type
profile u ∈ U , thus a∗ cannot be selected, and this violates the ontoness of (x, t) on U .
We first prove F0. When |{i
′ ∈ N | i′ 6= i, ui′ /∈ U˜i}| ≤ 0, we know u−i ∈ U˜−i. For any i ∈ N and
any u−i ∈ U˜−i, assuming ti,a∗(u−i) <∞, there exists ui ∈ U˜i s.t. pi,a∗ − ti,a∗(u−i) > pi,a − ti,a(u−i)
for all a 6= a∗, given that U˜i is unrestricted. In this case, given the parallel profile (ui, u−i), a
∗ is
the unique agent-maximizing alternative for agent i thus has to be selected. This contradicts the
assumption that x(u) 6= a∗ for all u ∈ U˜ , thus ti,a∗(u−i) =∞ must hold.
Now assume Fℓ−1 holds for some ℓ s.t. 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ n− 2, we show that Fℓ also holds. W.l.o.g., we
consider agent 1 and some u−1 s.t. ui ∈ U˜i for all i ≥ ℓ+ 2. In this case, only u2, . . . , uℓ+1 can be
non-parallel. Now consider agent 2, and any u1 ∈ U˜i, we know in u−2 = (u1, u−1,−2), |{i ∈ N |i 6=
2, ui /∈ U˜i}| ≤ ℓ − 1. As a result, Fℓ−1 implies that t2,a∗(u−2) = ∞, thus alternative a
∗ cannot be
agent-maximizing for agent 2 and therefore cannot be selected in the economy (u1, u−1). Since this
holds for any u1 ∈ U˜1, with the same arguments that we proved F0, we conclude t1,a∗(u−1) = ∞
must hold as well, since otherwise a∗ would be the unique agent-maximizing alternative for some
parallel type u1 and this violates DSIC. This proves Fℓ−1 ⇒ Fℓ, and therefore completes the proof
of this lemma.
We are now ready to prove the main theorem.
Proof of Theorem 3. Recall that U˜i , Ui ∩ U‖ for each i ∈ N , and U˜ , U ∩ U‖. For any social
choice mechanism (x, t) on U that satisfies (P1)-(P5), Lemma 6 implies that its restriction on U˜
must also satisfy (P1)-(P5). Theorem 2 then guarantees that there exist non-negative coefficients
{ki}i∈N , not all of them zero, and real constants {Ca}a∈A s.t. x(u) ∈ argmaxa∈A
∑
i∈N kipi,a +Ca
for all u ∈ U˜ . Although this does not immediately determine the outcome of the mechanism for
any non-parallel type profile u ∈ U\U˜ , we do know from agent independence that for any agent i,
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Figure 3: Illustration of u∗2 ∈ U2\U˜2, for Step 1 of the proof of Theorem 3.
and any parallel profile for the other agents u−i ∈ U˜−i, the agent-independent prices agent i faces
{ti,a(u−i)}a∈A must be characterized as in Lemma 5. We use this characterization and condition
(C2) Ui 6⊂ U‖ for at least n− 1 agents to prove the dictatorship result in the following two steps:
• Step 1: the number of agents s.t. ki 6= 0 is exactly one.
• Step 2: the only agent with ki 6= 0 must be a fixed price dictator.
Step 1: We know from Theorem 2 that there exists at least one agent with ki > 0. Assume towards
a contradiction, that there exist at least two agents, which we name agent 1 and agent 2, for whom
k1, k2 > 0. For at least one of them, say agent 2, U2 ⊆ U‖ does not hold due to condition (C2), thus
there exists a non-parallel type u∗2 ∈ U2\U˜2. We prove that for some parallel profile for the rest
of the agents u∗−1,−2 ∈ U˜−1,−2, there do not exist agent-independent prices {t1,a(u
∗
2, u
∗
−1,−2)}a∈A
for agent 1, such that for any u1 ∈ U˜1, there exists an alternative that is agent-maximizing for all
agents in economy (u1, u
∗
2, u
∗
−1,−2). This contradicts DSIC, therefore there is exactly one agent s.t.
ki > 0.
We assume w.l.o.g. that alternative a is one of agent 2’s favorite alternatives at zero payment:
a ∈ argmaxa′∈A v
∗
2,a′ (where v
∗
2,a , u
∗
2,a(0) for all a ∈ A). For any parallel type u2 ∈ U‖ s.t.
a ∈ argmaxa′∈A{v2,a′}, we know from the definition of the parallel domain that for any alternative
a′ ∈ A, u2,a′(z) = u2,a(z + p2,a − p2,a′) = u2,a(z + u
−1
2,a(v2,a′)) must hold for all z ≤ p2,a′ . u
∗
2 /∈ U‖
implies that there exists some alternative b /∈ argmina′∈A v
∗
2,a′ and some price z
∗ ∈ (0, p∗2,b] s.t.
u∗2,b(z
∗) 6= u∗2,a(z
∗ + (u∗2,a)
−1(v∗2,b)). Let w , u
∗
2,b(z
∗) and define ∆1 , (u
∗
2,a)
−1(v∗2,b) and ∆2 ,
(u∗2,a)
−1(w) − z∗. We assume u∗2,b(z
∗) < u∗2,a(z
∗ +∆1), in which case ∆2 > ∆1 ≥ 0, as illustrated
in Figure 3. The other direction can be proved in the same way.
Fixing the type of the agents other than 1 and 2 to be parallel with zero willingness to pay on
all alternatives, i.e. for all i ≥ 3, let u∗i ∈ U˜i be such that p
∗
i,a′ = 0 for all a
′ ∈ A. Such types exist
since U˜i is unrestricted for each i ∈ N . Denote u
∗
−1 = (u
∗
2, u
∗
3, . . . , u
∗
n), and let ǫ be some small
positive number s.t. 0 < ǫ < (∆2 −∆1)/2. We prove:
• Step 1.1: t1,b(u
∗
−1)− t1,a(u
∗
−1) ≤ k2/k1(∆1 + ǫ) + (Ca − Cb)/k1,
• Step 1.2: t1,b(u
∗
−1)− t1,a(u
∗
−1) ≥ k2/k1(∆2 − ǫ) + (Ca − Cb)/k1.
Since k2/k1(∆2 − ǫ) + (Ca − Cb)/k1 > k2/k1(∆1 + ǫ) + (Ca − Cb)/k1, we know that this is a
contradiction, thus the number of agents for whom ki > 0 cannot be more than one.
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Step 1.1: Assume towards a contradiction that t1,b(u
∗
−1)− t1,a(u
∗
−1) > k2/k1(∆1+ ǫ)+(Ca−Cb)/k1
and consider a parallel type u1 ∈ U˜1 of agent 1 with the following willingness to pay:
p1,c = 0, ∀c 6= a, b, (12)
p1,b = max
c 6=a,b
{
k2
k1
p∗2,c +
Cc − Cb
k1
}
+ δ, (13)
p1,a = p1,b −
(
k2
k1
(∆1 + ǫ/2) +
Ca − Cb
k1
)
, (14)
where δ is strictly positive, and large enough s.t. p1,a and p1,b as defined are both non-negative.
Such u1 is guaranteed to exist since U˜1 is unrestricted. We know from (14) and the assumption
t1,b(u
∗
−1)− t1,a(u
∗
−1) > k2/k1(∆1 + ǫ) + (Ca − Cb)/k1 that:
p1,a − t1,a(u
∗
−1)−
(
p1,b − t1,b(u
∗
−1)
)
=p1,a − p1,b +
(
t1,b(u
∗
−1)− t1,a(u
∗
−1)
)
>−
(
k2
k1
(∆1 + ǫ/2) +
Ca − Cb
k1
)
+
(
k2
k1
(∆1 + ǫ) +
Ca − Cb
k1
)
=
k2
2k1
ǫ > 0,
thus p1,a − t1,a(u
∗
−1) > p1,b − t1,b(u
∗
−1). We conclude according to Lemma 2 that with prices
{t1,a′(u
∗
−1)}a′∈A, b cannot be an agent-maximizing alternative for agent 1.
We now prove that b is the only agent-maximizing alternative for agent 2, therefore no al-
ternative can be agent-maximizing for both agents, leading to a contradiction to DSIC. First, by
assumption, p∗i,a′ = 0 for all i 6= 1, 2 and all a
′ ∈ A, thus when the type profile of the rest of the
economy is given by (u1, u
∗
3, . . . , u
∗
n), we have
argmax
a′∈A

k1p1,a′ +
∑
i≥3
kip
∗
i,a′ +Ca′

 = argmaxa′∈A {k1p1,a′ + Ca′} .
We can now check that b ∈ argmaxa′∈A
{
k1p1,a′ + Ca′
}
. From (14) we know
k1p1,b + Cb − (k1p1,a + Ca) = k1(p1,b − p1,a) + Cb − Ca
=k2(∆1 + ǫ/2) + (Ca − Cb)− (Ca − Cb) = k2(∆1 + ǫ/2) > 0,
thus k1p1,b + Cb > k1p1,a +Ca. Moreover, for any c 6= a, b, we know from (12) and (13) that
k1p1,b + Cb − (k1p1,c + Cc) = k1(p1,b − p1,c) + Cb − Cc
>k1
(
k2
k1
p∗2,c +
Cc − Cb
k1
)
+ Cb − Cc = k2p
∗
2,c ≥ 0,
therefore, k1p1,b+Cb > k1p1,c+Cc holds for all c 6= a, b. Now we know b ∈ argmaxa′∈A
{
k1p1,a′ + Ca′
}
which implies t2,b(u1, u
∗
−1,−2) = 0, according to Lemma 5. Thus we know the utility agent 2 gets
from alternative b at the current price is: u∗2,b(t2,b(u1, u
∗
−1,−2)) = u
∗
2,b(0) = v
∗
2,b.
For alternative a, we know from (11) and (14) that
t2,a(u1, u
∗
−1,−2) = t2,b(u1, u
∗
−1,−2) +
1
k2
(k1(p1,b − p1,a) + Cb − Ca)
=0 +
1
k2
(k2(∆1 + ǫ/2) + Ca − Cb + Cb − Ca) = ∆1 + ǫ/2 > ∆1.
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Therefore, u∗2,a(t2,a(u1, u
∗
−1,−2)) < u
∗
2,a(∆1) = v
∗
2,b. For all other alternatives c 6= a, b, we know from
(11), (12) and (13) that
t2,c(u1, u
∗
−1,−2) = t2,b(u1, u
∗
−1,−2) +
1
k2
(k1(p1,b − p1,c) + Cb − Cc)
>0 +
1
k2
(
k1
(
k2
k1
p∗2,c +
Cc − Cb
k1
)
+ Cb − Cc
)
= p∗2,c.
Therefore, u∗2,c(t2,c(u1, u
∗
−1,−2)) < mina′∈A v
∗
2,a′ ≤ v
∗
2,b for all c 6= a, b. This proves that {b} =
argmaxa′∈A u
∗
2,a′(t2,a′(u1, u
∗
−1,−2)), thus completes the proof of part Step 1.1.
Step 1.2: Assume for contradiction that t1,b(u
∗
−1)− t1,a(u
∗
−1) < k2/k1(∆2 − ǫ) + (Ca − Cb)/k1. As
discussed above, b cannot be the least preferred alternative at zero price according to u∗2, thus we
assume w.l.o.g. m ∈ argmina′∈A v
∗
2,a′ . Consider the type u1 ∈ U˜1 s.t.
p1,c = 0, ∀c 6= a, b,m,
p1,a = max
c 6=a,b,m
{
k2
k1
p∗2,c +
Cc − Ca
k1
}
+ δ,
p1,b = p1,a +
(
k2
k1
(∆2 − ǫ/2) +
Ca − Cb
k1
)
,
p1,m = p1,b +
1
k1
(k2z
∗ +Cb − Cm),
where δ is some non-negative number such that min{p1,a, p1,b, p1,m} ≥ 0.
7 Similar to the proof of
part Step 1.1, for u1 as constructed, we can show that a cannot be the agent-maximizing alternative
for agent 1 given prices {t1,a′(u
∗
−1)}a′∈A since p1,b − t1,b(u
∗
−1) > p1,a − t1,a(u
∗
−1) thus a is not the
maximizer of p1,a′ − t1,a′(u
∗
−1). Moreover, we can prove that a is the unique agent-maximizing
alternative for agent 2, by showing:
1) m ∈ argmaxa′∈A{k1p1,a′+Ca′}which implies t2,m(u1, u
∗
−1,−2) = 0, t2,a′(u1, u
∗
−1,−2) = 1/k2(k1p1,m+
Cm − k1p1,a′ −Ca′) for all a
′ ∈ A, and u∗2,m(t2,m(u1, u
∗
−1,−2)) = mina′∈A v
∗
2,a′ ≤ w.
2) t2,b(u1, u
∗
−1,−2) = z
∗ thus u∗2,b(t2,b(u1, u
∗
−1,−2)) = u
∗
2,b(z
∗) = w,
3) t2,c(u1, u
∗
−1,−2) > p
∗
2,c, thus u
∗
2,c(t2,c(u1, u
∗
−1,−2)) < mina′∈A v
∗
2,a′ ≤ w for all c 6= a, b,m, and
4) t2,a(u1, u
∗
−1,−2) = ∆2 + z
∗ − ǫ/2 < ∆2 + z
∗, therefore u∗2,a(t2,a(u1, u
∗
−1,−2)) > u
∗
2,a(∆2 + z
∗) =
w ≥ maxa′ 6=a{u
∗
2,a′(t2,a′(u1, u
∗
−1,−2))}.
This shows that no alternative is agent-maximizing for both agents 1 and 2, and completes the
proof of this Step 1.2, and also Step 1.
Step 2: The mechanism must be a fixed price dictatorship.
So far, we have proved that for any mechanism (x, t) satisfying (P1)-(P5), its restriction on the
parallel subdomain U˜ must be an affine maximizer of willingness to pay with coefficients {ki}i∈N
and constants {Ca}a∈A, where ki > 0 for exactly one agent. Let’s name her agent 1 and let ~z be a
vector of fixed prices in Rm≥0 s.t.
za ,
1
k1
(
max
a′∈A
{Ca′} − Ca
)
, ∀a ∈ A. (15)
7If the number of alternatives is exactly 3, then we may set p1,a = δ where δ ∈ R guarantees min{p1,a, p1,b, p1,m} =
0, so that the smallest willingness to pay among all alternatives is zero. The rest of the proof remains the same.
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To show that agent 1 is a fixed price dictator, i.e. x(u) ∈ argmaxa∈A u1,a(za) and t1(u) = zx(u) for
all u ∈ U , agent-maximization implies that it is sufficient to show for all u−1 ∈ U−1, t1,a(u−1) = za
holds. We prove this by induction on the number of agents whose types are not parallel in the
profile u−1. For any ℓ = 0, 1, . . . , n− 1, let the induction statements be
Gℓ: For all u−1 ∈ U−1 s.t. |{i ∈ N |i 6= 1, ui /∈ U‖}| ≤ ℓ, t1,a(u−1) = za holds for all a ∈ A.
Hℓ: For all i 6= 1, for all u−i ∈ U−i such that (I) |{j ∈ N |j 6= i, uj /∈ U‖}| ≤ ℓ, and (II) ∃a
∗ s.t.
u1,a∗(za∗) > u1,a(za) for all a 6= a
∗, we have ti,a∗(u−i) = 0, and ti,a(u−i) = +∞ for all a 6= a
∗.
We first observe that Lemma 5 implies G0. For u−1 s.t. |{i ∈ N |i 6= 1, ui /∈ U‖}| = 0, u−1 ∈ U˜−1,
thus part (i) of Lemma 5, agent-independence and the fact ki = 0 for i 6= 1 imply that ∀a ∈ A:
t1,a(u−1) =
1
k1
max
a′∈A


∑
i 6=1
kipi,a′ +Ca′

− 1k1

∑
i 6=1
kipi,a + Ca

 = 1
k1
(
max
a′∈A
Ca′ −Ca
)
= za.
We show in the following two steps that Gℓ ⇒ Hℓ and Hℓ−1 ⇒ Gℓ. This implies that Gℓ holds for
ℓ = n − 1, and completes the proof of the theorem. Hn−1 also implies that when the dictator has
a unique most preferred alternative at the fixed prices {za}a∈A, the rest of the agents cannot be
charged any payment.
Step 2.1: Gℓ ⇒ Hℓ for 0 ≤ ℓ ≤ n− 1.
W.l.o.g., consider agent i = 2, and some u−2 ∈ U−2 s.t. |{j ∈ N |j 6= 2, uj /∈ U‖}| = ℓ.
For any u2 ∈ U˜2, in the economy (u2, u−2), the number of agents in the profile u−1 with types
outside of the parallel domain is at most ℓ. Since |{j ∈ N |j 6= 2, uj /∈ U‖}| = ℓ and u2 is parallel,
|{j ∈ N |j 6= 1, uj /∈ U‖}| = ℓ− 1 if u1 /∈ U‖, and |{j ∈ N |j 6= 1, uj /∈ U‖}| = ℓ if u1 ∈ U‖. We know
from Gℓ that ti,a(u−1) = za for all a ∈ A.
If there exists a unique agent-maximizing alternative for agent 1 given fixed prices ~z, i.e. ∃a∗ s.t.
u1,a∗(za∗) > u1,a(za), ∀a 6= a
∗, the only alternative that can be selected in the economy (u2, u−2)
is a∗. This implies that for all u2 ∈ U˜2, x(u2, u−2) = a
∗ must hold. Since U˜2 is unrestricted, in
order for a∗ to be agent-maximizing for agent 2 for any u2 ∈ U˜2, we must have t2,a(u−2) = ∞ for
all a 6= a∗. Since prices must be standard, t2,a∗(u−2) = 0 and this completes the proof of Gℓ ⇒ Hℓ.
Step 2.2: Hℓ−1 ⇒ Gℓ for all 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ n− 1.
Let there be ℓ entries in u−1 that are outside of the parallel domain, and w.l.o.g. assume that
u2, . . . , uℓ+1 /∈ U‖. Assume that ∃a ∈ A s.t. t1,a(u−1) 6= za, we first show a contradiction for the
case that t1,a(u−1) > za, and then show that the other direction cannot hold either. First, note
that it cannot be the case if t1,a′(u−1) > za′ for all a
′ ∈ A. This is because ~z as defined in (15) is
a vector of standard prices with the minimal entry equal to 0. If t1,a′(u−1) > za′ for all a
′ ∈ A, we
know t1,a′(u−1) > 0 for all a
′, and this violates Lemma 1. W.l.o.g., we assume t1,b(u−1) ≤ zb.
Denote ǫ , t1,a(u−1) − za, we know ǫ > 0. Consider some parallel type of agent 1, u1 ∈ U˜1,
where the willingness to pay is of the form:
p1,a =za + ǫ/2,
p1,b =zb + ǫ/3,
p1,c =0, ∀c 6= a, b.
This gives us p1,b−zb = ǫ/3, p1,c−zc = −zc, ∀c 6= a, b, and therefore p1,a−za = ǫ/2 > p1,a′−za′ for
all a′ 6= a. Given Lemma 2, we know that a is the unique agent-maximizing alternative for agent
1 under the vector of prices ~z.
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In the economy (u1, u2, . . . , uℓ+1, uℓ+2, . . . , un), there are ℓ−1 entries in the profile u−2 that are
outside of the parallel domain: |{i ∈ N |i 6= 2, ui /∈ U‖}| = ℓ− 1. Hℓ−1 implies that t2,a(u−2) = 0,
t2,a′(u−2) = +∞ for all a
′ 6= a thus a is the unique agent-maximizing alternative for agent 2.
However, a cannot be agent-maximizing for agent 1, since
p1,a − t1,a(u−1)− (p1,b − t1,b(u−1)) ≤ p1,a − (za + ǫ)− p1,b + zb
=za + ǫ/2− (za + ǫ)− (zb + ǫ/3) + zb = −5/6ǫ < 0.
This contradicts DSIC, thus we conclude t1,a(u−1) > za cannot be true. Similarly, if t1,a(u−1) <
za, the price being standard requires that za > t1,a(u−1) ≥ 0 and that there exists b ∈ A s.t.
t1,b(u−1) ≥ zb. Let ǫ , za − t1,a(u−1) > 0, and let u1 be a parallel type with willingness to pay
p1,a = za − ǫ/2,
p1,b = zb + ǫ/3,
p1,c = 0, ∀c 6= a, b.
We can check that b is the unique agent-maximizing alternative for agent 1 under prices ~z thus Hℓ−1
implies that t2,a(u−2) =∞, thus a cannot be agent-maximizing for agent 2 thus cannot be selected
in the economy (u1, u2, . . . , un). However, a is the unique agent-maximizing alternative for agent
1, since p1,a− t1,a(u−1) = ǫ/2, whereas p1,b− t1,b(u−1) ≤ p1,b− zb = ǫ/3 and p1,c− t1,c(u−1) ≤ 0 for
all c 6= a, b. This is a contradiction, thus t1,a(u−1) = za must hold.
This completes the proof of this theorem.
From Gn−1 and Hn−1, we know that when the dictator has a unique most preferred alternative
under the fixed prices ~a, the rest of the agents do not make any payment to the mechanism.
However, when there are multiple most preferred alternatives that are tied for the dictator given
the prices ~z, Hn−1 does not specify what must happen to the payments from the rest of the
agents. We may consider various tie-breaking mechanisms among the alternatives toward which
the dictator is indifferent, for example another fixed price dictatorship, or some generalized weighted
VCG mechanism between two alternatives that are tied (in which case the general non-quasi-linear
utility domain U0 is parallel). These mechanism would still satisfy (P1)-(P5), and would charge
the non-dictators some non-zero payments in the degenerate case when the dictator is indifferent.
A.4 Relaxing IR and No Subsidy
Conditions (C1) and (C2) in Theorem 3 require the utility domain to deviate very minimally from
the parallel domain, however, the negative result no longer holds if one of (P4) or (P5) is relaxed.
(P4) IR and (P5) No subsidy require prices to be standard (Lemma 1). With standard prices,
the shapes of an agent’s utility functions where the prices are negative, or where the utilities are
below mina∈A vi,a, are irrelevant to which alternative is agent-maximizing for this agent. The
parallel domain only requires that the utility functions in the range that is relevant to be horizontal
translations of each other.
As we have shown in the proof of Lemma 5, an affine maximizer as the choice rule together with
DSIC determine the agent-independent prices that each agent faces up to a constant (when there are
no ties). The requirement that prices being standard then fully pins down the agent-independent
prices. Without (P4), (P5), a local violation of “the relative willingness to pay between any two
alternatives remains constant” (e.g. u∗2 as in Figure 2) can be made irrelevant by setting non-
standard prices carefully and we still get an incentive compatible mechanism.
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zui,a′(z)
z∗ pi,b(z
∗) pi,a(z
∗)
vi,a
vi,b
vi,ai
ui,ai(z
∗)
ui, a (z)
u i, b (z)
ui,ai(z)
Figure 4: An example type in the parallel domain w.r.t. z∗.
Here we provide a family of such mechanisms that violates only one of (P4) or (P5). This
shows that the parallel domain as we defined in Section 2 is not the only maximal utility domain
where mechanisms that satisfy (P1)-(P3) exist. We say a utility domain is parallel w.r.t. price z∗
if the relative willingness to pay remains the same in the range where (I) payments are at least
z∗, and (II) the utilities are weakly above mina′∈A{ui,a′(z
∗)}, as illustrated in Figure 4. Denote
pi,a(z
∗) , u−1i,a (mina′∈A{ui,a′(z
∗)}).
Definition 7. A utility domain for an agent Ui ⊂ U
0 is parallel with respect to z∗ ∈ R if ∀ui ∈ Ui,
∀a, b ∈ A s.t. ui,a(z
∗) ≥ ui,b(z
∗), and ∀z ∈ [z∗, pi,b(z
∗)], ui,a (z + (pi,a(z
∗)− pi,b(z
∗)) = ui,b(z).
Definition 8. The generalized weighted VCG mechanism with fixed payment z∗ parametrized by
z∗, non-negative weights {ki}i∈N and real constants {Ca}a∈A collects type profile uˆ from the agents,
and computes the willingness to pay {pˆi,a(z
∗)}i∈N,a∈A w.r.t. z
∗.
• Choice rule: x(uˆ)= a∗ where a∗∈argmaxa∈A
{∑
i∈N kipˆi,a(z
∗)+Ca
}
, breaking ties arbitrarily.
• Payment rule: ti(uˆ) = z
∗ for i ∈ N s.t. ki = 0; for i s.t. ki 6= 0:
ti(uˆ)=
1
ki

∑
j 6=i
kj pˆj,a∗−i(z
∗)+Ca∗−i−
∑
j 6=i
kj pˆj,a∗(z
∗)−Ca∗

+z∗,
where a∗−i ∈ argmaxa∈A{
∑
j 6=i kj pˆj,a(z
∗) + Ca}.
Proposition 1. Assuming Ui is parallel w.r.t. z
∗ for all i ∈ N , the generalized weighted VCG
mechanism with fixed payment z∗ and at least one non-zero coefficient ki satisfies (P1)-(P3). In
addition, (P4) is satisfied if z∗ is non-positive, whereas (P5) is satisfied if z∗ is non-negative.
Proof. It is immediate that the mechanism is DSIC for agents i ∈ N s.t. ki = 0. Fix an agent i ∈ N
s.t. ki > 0. Her agent-independent prices is given by: ti,a(uˆ−i) = 1/ki(
∑
j 6=i kj pˆj,a∗−i(z
∗) + Ca∗−i −∑
j 6=i kj pˆj,a(z
∗) − Ca) + z
∗, which implies ti,a∗−i(uˆ−i) = z
∗ and ti,a(uˆ−i) ≥ z
∗ for all a. Similar to
Lemma 1, we can show that the agent-maximizing alternative for agent i given {ti,a(uˆ−i)}a∈A is the
maximizer of pˆi,a(z
∗)− ti,a(uˆ−i). We can then examine that a
∗ is a maximizer of pˆi,a(z
∗)− ti,a(uˆ−i),
and this implies that the choice rule is agent-maximizing and this completes the proof of DSIC.
When z∗ ≤ 0, the minimum agent-independent price for agent i among all alternatives is non-
positive, thus the agent-maximizing alternative gives the agent a utility at least mina∈A uˆi,a(z
∗) ≥
mina∈A uˆi,a(0) thus (P4) IR is satisfied. When z
∗ ≥ 0, all agent-independent prices are non-negative,
thus the mechanism satisfies (P5) No subsidy.
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A.4.1 Proof of Theorem 4
Theorem 4. With at least three alternatives and a utility domain U =
∏n
i=1 Ui s.t. for each i ∈ N ,
Ui contains an unrestricted linear domain with two slopes, a social choice mechanism satisfying
(P1)-(P3) must be a fixed price dictatorship.
We first define strictly parallel domains as sets of agent types where utility curves are horizontal
shifts of each other everywhere. Quasi-linear utility functions, for example, are strictly parallel.
Definition 9 (Strictly Parallel Domain). A utility domain Ui ⊂ U
0 is a strictly parallel domain if
for all ui ∈ Ui,
ui,a (z + (pi,a − pi,b)) = ui,b(z), ∀z ∈ R, ∀a, b ∈ A. (16)
On any strictly parallel domain, pi,a − ti,a ≥ pi,b − ti,b ⇔ ui,a(ti,a) ≥ ui,b(ti,b) holds for any
prices ti,a, ti,b ∈ R, therefore, argmaxa∈A{ui,a(ti,a)} = argmaxa∈A{pi,a − ti,a} holds for any prices,
without the requirement that the prices are standard. This implies that W-Mon is a necessary
condition for any mechanism that is deterministic and DSIC for strictly parallel utility domains,
and that Roberts’ theorem can be generalized without the additional assumptions (P4) and (P5).
Lemma 7. With any strictly parallel utility domain U , every social choice mechanism that is DSIC
and deterministic must satisfy W-Mon in terms of willingness to pay.
Lemma 8 (Roberts’ Theorem on Strictly Parallel Domains). With three or more alternatives, and
an unconstrained strictly parallel domain U , for every social choice mechanism that satisfies (P1)-
(P3), there exist non-negative weights k1, . . . , kn (not all of them zero) and constants C1, . . . , Cm
such that for all u ∈ U , x(u) ∈ argmaxa∈A {
∑n
i=1 kipi,a + Ca}.
We now prove the impossibility result for the linear domain with two slopes.
Proof of Theorem 4. Let Uαi ⊂ Ui be the set of all ui ∈ Ui s.t. ui,a(z) = vi,a − αiz holds for all
a ∈ A, i.e. the set of “α types”. We know Uαi is a strictly parallel domain with unrestricted
willingness to pay. Let Uα ,
∏n
i=1 U
α
i , Lemma 6 implies that fixing any mechanism (x, t) on U
that satisfies (P1)-(P3), the restriction of (x, t) on Uα must also satisfy (P1)-(P3). Lemma 8 then
implies that there exists non-negative coefficients {ki}i∈N and real constants {Ca}a∈A s.t. ki 6= 0
for some i ∈ N and x(u) ∈ argmaxa∈A {
∑n
i=1 kipi,a + Ca} for all u ∈ U
α. With the same arguments
as in the proof of Lemma 5, we can show that ∀i ∈ N s.t. ki > 0, ∀a, b ∈ A, the difference in the
agent-independent prices satisfies:
ti,a(u−i)− ti,b(u−i) =
1
ki

∑
j 6=i
kjpj,b + Cb −
∑
j 6=i
kjpj,a − Ca

 . (17)
Assume without loss of generality that k1 > 0, we prove that agent 1 is the fixed-price dictator
with the following steps.
• Step 1. ki = 0 for all i 6= 1.
• Step 2. There exist fixed prices ~z ∈ Rm s.t. ∀u−1 ∈ U
α
−1, ∀a ∈ A, t1,a(u−1) = za.
• Step 3. Agent 1 is the fixed-price dictator for any u ∈ U .
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Figure 5: Illustration of u1 ∈ U1\U
α
1 , for the proof of Claim 4.
The reason that Step 2 is not immediately implied by Step 1 is that without the assumptions
of (P4) and (P5), so that prices are not necessarily standard, (17) only pins down the agent-
independent prices up to a constant, and we need to show by induction that the prices t1,a(u−1)
must be fixed for all u−1 ∈ U
α
−1. We then prove in Step 3 by induction that t1,a(u−1) = za must
hold for all u−1 ∈ U−1, which shows that agent 1 is the fixed price dictator.
Step 1. We show by contradiction that k2 = 0 must hold. The same argument can be repeated for
all i 6= 1. We first prove the following claim.
Claim 4. Fix any u−1,−2 ∈ U
α
−1,−2, and assume k1, k2 > 0. ∀a, b ∈ A, and ∀u2, u
′
2 ∈ U
α
2 , p2,a−p2,b =
p′2,a − p
′
2,b ⇒ t1,a(u2, u−1,−2) = t1,a(u
′
2, u−1,−2).
Proof. Let u2, u
′
2 ∈ U
α
2 be two types of agent 2 s.t. p2,a − p2,b = p
′
2,a − p
′
2,b, and assume for contra-
diction that t1,a(u2, u−1,−2) 6= t1,a(u
′
2, u−1,−2). Denote u−1 , (u2, u−1,−2) and u
′
−1 , (u
′
2, u−1,−2).
t1,a(u−1) − t1,b(u−1) = t1,a(u
′
−1) − t1,b(u
′
−1) follows from (17). Assume w.l.o.g. that t1,a(u−1) <
t1,a(u
′
−1), and that α1 > β1. We can construct u1 ∈ U1 as illustrated in Figure 5 such that
u1,a(z) = v1,a − α1z, u1,b(z) = v1,b − β1z, and that
u1,c(t1,c(u−1)) < u1,b(t1,b(u−1)) < u1,a(t1,a(u−1)), ∀c 6= a, b, (18)
u1,c(t1,c(u
′
−1)) < u1,a(t1,a(u
′
−1)) < u1,b(t1,b(u
′
−1)), ∀c 6= a, b. (19)
Such u1 exists since α1 > β1, t1,a(u−1) − t1,b(u−1) = t1,a(u
′
−1) − t1,b(u
′
−1), and the values are
unrestricted. Agent-maximizing for agent 1 then implies x(u1, u−1) = a and x(u1, u
′
−1) = b. Note
that the agent-independent prices facing agent 2, {t2,a′(u−2)}a′∈A, remain the same in the two
economies. Agent-maximization for agent 2 therefore implies
p2,a− t2,a(u−2)≥ p2,b− t2,b(u−2),
p′2,a− t2,a(u−2)≤ p
′
2,b− t2,b(u−2).
Given the assumption p2,a − p2,b = p
′
2,a − p
′
2,b, we must have
p2,a − p2,b = p
′
2,a − p
′
2,b = t2,a(u−2)− t2,b(u−2). (20)
Let ǫ be some small positive number such that 0 < ǫ < u1,b(t1,b(u
′
−1))−u1,a(t1,a(u
′
−1)). Consider
type u′1 ∈ U1 such that for all z ∈ R, u
′
1,a(z) = u1,a(z), u
′
1,b(z) = u1,b(z)−ǫ and u
′
1,c(z) = u1,c(z). In
words, u′1 is identical to u1, except that v
′
1,b = v1,b−ǫ, where ǫ is small enough that both (18) and (19)
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still hold if u1 is replaced with u
′
1. Thus we have x((u
′
1, u2, u−1,−2)) = a and x((u
′
1, u
′
2, u−1,−2)) = b
from agent-maximization for agent 1 given u′1.
Replacing u1 with u
′
1 results in a decrease in the willingness to pay for alternative b, thus
p′1,a−p
′
1,b > p1,a−p1,b. Given (17) and the assumption that k1, k2 > 0, we know t2,a((u
′
1, u−1,−2))−
t2,b((u
′
1, u−1,−2)) < t2,a(u−2)− t2,b(u−2). Combined with (20), we know:
t2,a((u
′
1, u−1,−2))− t2,b((u
′
1, u−1,−2)) < p
′
2,a − p
′
2,b
⇒p′2,a − t2,a((u
′
1, u−1,−2)) > p
′
2,b − t2,b((u
′
1, u−1,−2)),
meaning that the alternative x((u′1, u
′
2, u−1,−2)) = b is not agent-maximizing for agent 2 in economy
(u′1, u
′
2, u−1,−2). This contradicts DSIC, thus we conclude that t1,a(u2, u−1,−2) = t1,a(u
′
2, u−1,−2)
must hold.
Assume k1, k2 > 0, fix any u−1,−2 ∈ U
α
−1,−2 and some u
∗
2 ∈ U
α
2 , we know t1,a(u
∗
2, u−1,−2) < ∞,
since k1 > 0 and U
α
1 is unrestricted thus there exists u1 ∈ U
α
1 s.t. x((u1, u
∗
2, u−1,−2)) = a. Denote
∆∗a,b , p
∗
2,a − p
∗
2,b, ∆
∗
a,c , p
∗
2,a − p
∗
2,c and za , t1,a(u
∗
2, u−1,−2). We know from Claim 4 that
∀u2 ∈ U
α
2 s.t. p2,a − p2,c = ∆
∗
a,c, t1,a(u2, u−1,−2) = za. For any ∆a,b ∈ R, we can find u
′
2 ∈ U
α
2
s.t. p′2,a − p
′
2,b = ∆a,b and p
′
2,a − p
′
2,c = ∆
∗
a,c, for which t1,a(u
′
2, u−1,−2) = za. Apply Claim 4
again, we know that for all u2 ∈ U
α
2 s.t. p2,a − p2,b = ∆a,b, t1,a(u2, u−1,−2) = za. Since this
holds for all ∆a,b ∈ R, we conclude that ∀u2 ∈ U
α
2 , t1,a(u2, u−1,−2) = za. This implies that even
for u2, u
′
2 ∈ U
α
2 s.t. p2,a − p2,b 6= p
′
2,a − p
′
2,b, we still have t1,a(u2, u−1,−2) − t1,b(u2, u−1,−2) =
t1,a(u
′
2, u−1,−2)− t1,b(u
′
2, u−1,−2). This contradicts (17), thus k2 = 0 must hold.
Step 2. Given (17) and Step 1 that ki = 0 for all i 6= 1, we know that for all u−1 ∈ U
α
−1, for any
pair of alternatives a, b ∈ A, t1,a(u−1) − t1,b(u−1) = 1/k1(Cb − Ca) must hold. Denote this price
difference as δa,b , 1/k1(Cb − Ca). We prove the following claim.
Claim 5. For all i 6= 1, for all u−1,−i ∈ U
α
−1,−i, and for all ui, u
′
i ∈ U
α
i , if there exists a
∗ ∈ A s.t.
t1,a∗((u
′
i, u−1,−i)) 6= t1,a∗((ui, u−1,−i)), then pi,a = p
′
i,a for all a ∈ A, i.e. ui and u
′
i have the same
willingness to pay for all a ∈ A.
Proof. Fix agent i = 2 and any u−1,−i ∈ U
α
−1,−i, denote u−1 , (u2, u−1,−2), u
′
−1 = (u
′
2, u−1,−2), and
assume that there exists a ∈ A s.t. t1,a(u
′
−1) > t1,a(u−1). We first prove p2,a − p
′
2,a = p2,b− p
′
2,b for
all b ∈ A. This pins down the willingness to pay for all alternatives up to a constant. The fact that
the smallest willingness to pay among all alternatives must be zero then implies p2,b = p
′
2,b for all
b ∈ A. Repeating the same arguments for all i 6= 1 completes the proof of this claim.
We now prove p2,a − p
′
2,a = p2,b − p
′
2,b. First, we know t1,a(u
′
−1) − t1,b(u
′
−1) = t1,a(u−1) −
t1,b(u−1) = δa,b from Step 1. Same as the proof of Claim 4, we may find u1 ∈ U1 as shown in
Figure 5, where (18) and (19) both hold. Agent-maximization for agent 1 then implies
x((u1, u2, u−1,−2)) = a, x((u1, u
′
2, u−1,−2)) = b. (21)
Similarly, there exists u′1 ∈ U1 as illustrated in Figure 6 such that u
′
1,a(z) = v
′
1,a − β1z, u
′
1,b(z) =
v′1,b − α1z, and that
u′1,c(t1,c(u−1)) < u
′
1,a(t1,a(u−1)) < u
′
1,b(t1,b(u−1)), ∀c 6= a, b,
u′1,c(t1,c(u
′
−1)) < u
′
1,b(t1,b(u
′
−1)) < u
′
1,a(t1,a(u
′
−1)), ∀c 6= a, b.
Agent-maximization for agent 1 with type u′1 then requires
x((u′1, u2, u−1,−2)) = b, x((u
′
1, u
′
2, u−1,−2)) = a. (22)
30
zu′1,a′(z)
v′1,a
u′1,a(z)
u′1,b(z)
t1,a(u−1) t1,a(u
′
−1) t1,b(u−1) t1,b(u
′
−1)
Figure 6: Illustration of u′1 ∈ U1, for the proof of Claim 5.
Given (21), we know from W-Mon that p2,a − p
′
2,a ≥ p2,b − p
′
2,b must hold. Similarly, we get
p2,a − p
′
2,a ≤ p2,b − p
′
2,b from (22), therefore p2,a − p
′
2,a = p2,b − p
′
2,b.
Intuitively, Claim 5 shows that for any i 6= 1, for any u−1,−i ∈ U
α
−1,−i, and any all ui, u
′
i ∈ U
α
i ,
if there exists a ∈ A s.t. pi,a 6= p
′
i,a, then we must have t1,a′((u
′
i, u−1,−i)) = t1,a′((ui, u−1,−i)) for all
a′ ∈ A. Fix any u∗−1 = (u
∗
2, . . . , u
∗
n) ∈ U
α
−1, and define za , t1,a(u
∗
−1) for all a ∈ A. We prove by
induction that ∀u−1 ∈ U
α
−1, t1,a(u−1) = za must hold for all a ∈ A. For any ℓ = 0, 1, . . . , n − 1, let
the induction statements be
G∗ℓ : ∀u−1 ∈ U
α
−1 s.t. |{i ∈ N |i 6= 1, ui 6= u
∗
i }| ≤ ℓ, t1,a(u−1) = za,∀a ∈ A.
H∗ℓ : ∀i 6= 1, for all u1 ∈ U1 and ∀u−1,−i ∈ U
α
−1,−i, if (I) |{j ∈ N |j 6= 1, j 6= i, uj 6= u
∗
j}| ≤ ℓ, and
(II) ∃a∗ s.t. u1,a∗(za∗) > u1,a(za), ∀a 6= a
∗, then ti,a(u−i) = +∞ ∀a 6= a
∗.
G∗0 trivially holds from agent-independence since when |{i ∈ N |i 6= 1, ui 6= u
∗
i }| ≤ 0, u−1 = u
∗
−1.
We now prove G∗ℓ ⇒ H
∗
ℓ and H
∗
ℓ−1 ⇒ G
∗
ℓ , and this would complete the proof of the claim of this
step, which is G∗n−1.
Step 2.1. G∗ℓ ⇒ H
∗
ℓ for all 0 ≤ ℓ ≤ n− 1.
Consider agent i = 2, and fix any u−1,−2 ∈ U
α
−1,−2 s.t. |{j ∈ N |j 6= 1, j 6= 2, uj 6= u
∗
j}| ≤ ℓ. We
know from G∗ℓ that for all a ∈ A, t1,a(u
∗
2, u−1,−2) = za. Fix some u1 ∈ U1 for which there exists
a∗ ∈ A s.t. u1,a∗(za∗) > u1,a(za) for all a 6= a
∗. For any alternative b 6= a∗, and any u2 ∈ U
α
2
s.t. p2,b > p
∗
2,b, we know from Claim 5 that t1,a(u2, u−1,−2) = t1,a(u
∗
2, u−1,−2) = za for all a ∈ A,
thus a∗ is also the unique agent-maximizing alternative for agent 1 in the economy (u1, u2, u−1,−2).
Since p2,b can be arbitrarily large, we must have t2,b(u1, u−1,−2) = ∞ so that a
∗ is also always
agent-maximizing for agent 2. The same argument can be repeated for all agents i 6= 1.
Step 2.2. G∗ℓ−1 and H
∗
ℓ−1 ⇒ G
∗
ℓ , for all 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ n− 1.
Consider any type profile u−1 ∈ U
α
−1 such that |{i ∈ N |i 6= 1, ui 6= u
∗
i }| = ℓ. We assume w.l.o.g.
that u2 6= u
∗
2. We know fromG
∗
ℓ−1 that t1,a(u
∗
2, u−1,−2) = za holds for all a ∈ A, since in (u
∗
2, u−1,−2),
|{i ∈ A|i 6= 1, ui 6= u
∗
i }| = ℓ−1. Given that both u2 and u
∗
2 are in U
α
2 , if there exists any alternative
a ∈ A s.t. p2,a 6= p
∗
2,a, we know from Claim 5 that t1,a(u2, u−1,−2) = t1,a(u
∗
2, u−1,−2) = za holds for
all a ∈ A, which is what we are looking for. Therefore, the only remaining case is for u2 ∈ U
α
2 s.t.
p2,a = p
∗
2,a for all a ∈ A.
Assume toward a contradiction, that there exists u2 ∈ U
α
2 s.t. p2,a = p
∗
2,a for all a ∈ A, for
which there exists an alternative, say alternative a s.t. t1,a(u2, u−1,−2) 6= t1,a(u
∗
2, u−1,−2) = za.
Assume t1,a(u2, u−1,−2) > t1,a(u
∗
2, u−1,−2), and the other direction can be proved similarly. Fix any
alternative b 6= a, we know from (17) that t1,a(u2, u−1,−2) − t1,b(u2, u−1,−2) = t1,a(u
∗
2, u−1,−2) −
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t1,b(u
∗
2, u−1,−2) must hold. Similar to the proof of Claim 4, we can find u1 ∈ U1 s.t. u1,a(z) =
v1,a − α1z, u1,b = v1,b − β1z for all z ∈ R, and that
u1,c(t1,c(u
∗
2, u−1,−2)) < u1,b(t1,b(u
∗
2, u−1,−2)) < u1,a(t1,a(u
∗
2, u−1,−2)), ∀c 6= a, b,
u1,c(t1,c(u2, u−1,−2)) < u1,a(t1,a(u2, u−1,−2)) < u1,b(t1,b(u2, u−1,−2)), ∀c 6= a, b.
We know that in the economy (u1, u2, u−1,−2), alternative b is the unique agent-maximizing
alternative for agent 1. However, given since t1,a′(u
∗
2, u−1,−2) = za′ holds for all a
′ ∈ A, we know
that given the vector of prices ~z, alternative a is the unique agent-maximizing alternative for
agent 1. Therefore, H∗ℓ−1 together with |{i ∈ A|i 6= 1, i 6= 2, ui 6= u
∗
i }| = ℓ − 1 implies that
t2,b(u1, u−1,−2) =∞. This shows that alternative b cannot be agent-maximizing for agent 2 in the
economy (u1, u2, u−1,−2). This violates DSIC, completes the proof of G
∗
ℓ−1 and H
∗
ℓ−1 ⇒ G
∗
ℓ , and
also the proof of Step 2 of this theorem.
Step 3. Step 2 implies that when u−1 ∈ U
α
−1, the outcome of the mechanism must be determined
according to the fixed price dictator where agent 1 is the dictator and the fixed prices are given by ~z.
The proof of the third step is very similar to the proof of Step 2 of Theorem 3: by induction on the
number of agents whose type is outside of Uαi , we can show that the outcome must be determined
by the same fixed-price dictatorship for any u ∈ U . This completes the proof of Theorem 4.
B Impossibility Result Assuming Pareto Efficiency
We show in this section that if condition (P3) onto is replaced by a stronger Pareto efficiency (PE),
we obtain a similar dictatorship result as in Theorem 5 with weaker assumptions on the utility
domain: instead of requiring all but one agent having non-parallel types, it is sufficient that there
exists a single agent with a single non-parallel type. Moreover, these efficient mechanisms must be
full dictatorships instead of fixed-price dictatorships— the dictator chooses her favorite alternative,
and efficiency requires that she does not make any payment to the mechanism.
Definition 10 (Pareto Efficiency). A social choice mechanism is Pareto efficient if for any type
profile, it is impossible to select another alternative and adjust the payments in a way that (i) all
agents are weakly better off, (ii) at least one agent is strictly better off, and (iii) the total payment
to the mechanism is not reduced.
Theorem 5. With at least three alternatives and a utility domain U =
∏n
i=1 Ui such that
(C1) for each i ∈ N , Ui contains an unrestricted parallel domain,
(C2’) there exists an agent i ∈ N such that Ui 6⊂ U‖,
the only social choice mechanisms that satisfies (P1) DSIC, (P2) deterministic, (P4) IR, (P5) no
subsidy, and Pareto efficiency, are dictatorships.
Proof. We first observe that any mechanism that satisfy the given conditions must also be onto,
therefore all (P1)-(P5) hold. For any alternative a ∈ A, consider the parallel type profile u where
the willingness to pay is given by
p1,a = 1; p1,a′ = 0, ∀a
′ 6= a,
pi,a′ = 0, ∀a
′ ∈ A.
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Such a type profile is guaranteed to exist given (C1). Assume that any alternative b 6= a is selected,
we know from IR and No subsidy that there cannot be any payment from any agent. However,
this violates PE, since if alternative a is selected instead without charging any payment from any
agent, agent 1 is strictly better off while the rest of the agents are indifferent. This shows that
every alternative is selected for some type profile thus the mechanism is onto.
Following the notation as in the proof of Theorem 3, we denote the parallel subdomains as
U˜i , Ui ∩ U‖ for each i ∈ N , and let U˜ , U ∩ U‖ be the set of all parallel type profiles. Theorem 2
implies any mechanism that satisfy (P1)-(P5) must be an affine maximizer on U˜ , with non-negative
coefficients {ki}i∈N , not all of them are zero, and real constants {Ca}a∈A.
We first show that Pareto efficiency requires that the constants have to be all equal. Let
a ∈ argmaxa′∈A Ca′ . Assume that the constants are not all equal, there exists b ∈ A s.t. Ca > Cb.
Since there is at least one agent with ki > 0, assume w.l.o.g. that k1 > 0. Denote ǫ , 1/k1(Ca−Cb),
and consider a parallel type profile with willingness to pay given by:
p1,a = ǫ/2, p1,b = ǫ, p1,c = 0, ∀c 6= a, b,
pi,a′ = 0, ∀i 6= 1, ∀a
′ ∈ A.
We can check that alternative a is the unique maximizer of the choice rule, and therefore will
be selected. Lemma 5 then implies that no agent makes any payment to the mechanism, since
ti,a(u−1) = 1/k1(Ca−Ca) = 0, and there is no tie in the choice rule. This violates Pareto efficiency,
since selecting alternative b without charging any payment from any agent is a strict improvement
for agent 1, and does not make any other agent worse off. This implies that the constants have to
be all equal.
We will show that the number of agents with a non-zero coefficient is exactly one, similar to
Step 1 of the proof of Theorem 3. Since Step 2 of the proof of Theorem 3 does not depend on the
assumption (C2) and relies only on (C1), we can then repeat the same argument and reach the
conclusion that the mechanism must be a fixed price dictatorship. The fact that the coefficients
{Ca}a∈A being all equal then implies that the fixed prices that the dictator faces must be all zero.
We now prove |{i ∈ N |ki > 0}| = 1. Given (C2
′), we assume w.l.o.g. that there exist a
non-parallel type for agent 1: u∗1 ∈ U1\U‖. With the same arguments as in Step 1 in the proof
of Theorem 3, we can show that for any other agent i 6= 1, there is at most one of them with a
non-zero coefficient. This implies that either (i) k1 = 0, or (ii) ki = 0 for all i 6= 1. For case (ii),
we already have |{i ∈ N |ki > 0}| = 1. For case (ii), we only need to consider the case where there
are at least two other agents with non-zero coefficients, which we name agent 2 and 3. Consider a
parallel type profile with willingness to pay given by:
p1,a = 10/k2, p1,b = 0, p1,c = 0,
p2,a = 5/k2, p2,b = 10/k2, p2,c = 0,
p3,a = 4/k3, p3,b = 0, p3,c = 8/k3,
and if there are any other agent, or any alternative other than a, b, c, let the willingness to pay be all
zeros. Since the constants are all equal, and given k1 = 0, we know x(u) = b = argmaxa′∈A{k2p2,a′+
k3p3,a′}, and Lemma 5 again implies that t2(u) = 8/k2, and ti(u) = 0 for all i 6= 2. This is not
a Pareto efficient outcome, since if we select alternative a instead, collect 8/k2 from agent 1, and
charge no payment from any other agent, all of agents 1, 2 and 3 are strictly better off, and the rest of
the agents, if there are any, are indifferent. This is a contradiction, implies that |{i ∈ N |ki > 0}| = 1
must hold, and completes the proof of the theorem.
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